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The security of information and personal privacy are the growing concerns in today’s human 
life worldwide. The storage of biometric data in the database has raised the prospect of 
compromising the database leading to grave risks and misuse of the person’s privacy such as 
growth in terrorism and identity fraud. When a person’s biometric data stored is revealed, 
their security and privacy are being compromised. This research described a detailed 
evaluation on several outbreaks and threats associated with the biometric technology. It 
analyzed the user’s fear and intimidations to the biometric technology alongside the 
protection steps for securing the biometric data template in the database. It is known that, 
when somebody’s biometric data template is compromised from the database that 
consequently might indicate proof of identity robbery of that person.  Mixed method to 
compute and articulate the results as well as a new tactic of encryption-decryption algorithm 
with a design pattern of Model View Template (MVT) are used for securing the biometric 
data template in the database. The model managed information logically, the view indicated 
the visualization of the data, and the template directed the data migration into pattern object. 
Factors influencing fear of biometric technology such as an exposer of personal information, 
improper data transfer, and data misuse are found. Strong knowledge of the ideal technology 
like the private skills of the biometric technology, data secrecy and perceived helpfulness are 
established. The fears and attacks along the technology like a counterfeit of documents and 
brute-force attack are known. The designed algorithm based on the cryptographic module of 
the Fernet keys instance are utilized. The Fernet keys are combined to generate a multiFernet 
key, integrated with biometric data to produce two encrypted files (byte and text file). These 
files are incorporated with Twilio message and firmly stored in the database. The storage 
database has security measures that guard against an impostor’s attack. The database system 
can block the attacker from unauthorized access. Thus, significantly increased individual data 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Background of the problem  
The biometric is derived from the Greek words bios “life” and metrics “measure” 
(Ambalakat, 2005; Ashok & Shivashankar, 2006). Its pattern is to identify, recognize and 
verify users based on their unique traits such as physiological characteristics (Fingerprint, 
Palm Print, Face and Iris) and behavioral characteristics (Signature, Keystroke and Giant). 
The voice can either be physical or behavior traits. Today’s human verification factors are 
categorized into three; Things you know, e.g. secret password, Personal Identification 
Number (PIN); Things you hold, smart card etc., and who you are, biometrics (Jain, Flynn & 
Ross, 2007). However, the first two factors can be tricked. For example, password and PINs 
can be given to different person, perhaps causing an identity robbery or misuse (Jain et al., 
2007). Besides, it can be illegally taken from straight look. Once an intruder has the 
password, the person has total access to the related resource. The foremost benefit of 
biometrics is persons identification, it entails the individual presences at the stage of the 
validation convenience (Prabhakar, Pankanti & Jain, 2003). 
Currently the biometric technologies are used in laptops and smartphones. Many of the 
largest Internet of things (IoT) players, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Tecno and Apple are 
already offering biometric verification as an entity in some products and are working on 
deploying more and extend further into the households and businesses. Digital electronic link 
library (Dell), Hewlett Packard (Hp) among other technologies comes with inbuilt digital web 
camera that can scan individual characters for verification, such as simplest attendance or 
time applications to most sophisticated security access control installation. The high-scale 
initiatives, like the Indian Unique Identification (IUID) of the India government (Jacobsen, 
2012) and European Commission (Sontowski, 2018), have currently embraced biometrics as 
their recognition technology.   
However, irrespective of the vital development in the current eras, the biometric encounters 
intimidations (Bolle, Connell & Ratha, 2002). The primary worry is user’s secrecy and 
security dangers. When a person’s biometric data is hijacked, the attacker can utilize it to 




The world’s premier technical security conference organized by the University of Hanoi 
(Vietnam) in 2009, demonstrated how biometric system can simply be tricked and bypassed. 
Fake face image of the lawful user is utilized, within a few moments, authorization access is 
gained into the application. The susceptibility is immediately recorded in the nationwide 
database, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The Apple Inc. in 2013, set 
a novel device, iPhone 5s with fingerprint instrument for login to secure users’ data.  Fewer 
than two days subsequently, German hacker using gummy fingerprint successfully confirmed 
the spoofed device. These confirmed quite a few others, the intimidations and exposures in 
the present biometric based data protection. 
In Uganda, the problems associated with biometrics technology are exposer of personal data, 
data misuse (maltreatment) and improper data transfer as well as threats and attacks such as, 
counterfeit of documents and brute-force attack. For instance, fifteen-thousand-two-hundred 
and seventy-seven million thumbprints intended for National Identity Cards (NIC) is pulled 
out from National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) database storage, 
elevated serious worry to citizens (Rindai, 2016). Although some observers appreciated it as 
a full exercise against scam deterrence and individuality, the fear for citizens’ secrecy and 
security of the biometric data template in the database remained a big research query. It can 
also be realized that, in 2001, the state of Colorado tried to sell their face and fingerprint 
database to any government agency that wants access (Krause, 2001). This jeopardizes 
individual safety and identity.  
According to Kumar and Srinivasan (2013) if a person request, for instance, a permit, the 
government holds the evidence. The data submitted cannot be deleted, it’s compromised 
forever, only with a smart card, the bank can create the individual a new card with different 
PIN, because a user has merely a restricted number of biometrics, one face, 10 fingers, and 
two irises which are hardly replaceable. 
Consequently, protecting and securing the biometric data template in the database server 
against the secrecy and security infringement is really paramount, because it helps provide 
popularize usage of biometric with increasing user adoption and ensure trust in the scheme 
and with people working in the application. Therefore, countermeasure to a spoofing attack is 
required like liveness detection to spot some biological signs as well as an encryption-
decryption algorithm in securing the biometric data in the storage (Kalvet, Karlzén, Hunstad 
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& Tiits, 2018). It assumed that multi-modal systems (e.g. combining face, fingerprint or iris 
biometric modalities) is harder to spoof than unimodal systems.  
1.2 Statement of the problem  
With the prevalent deployment of biometric technology, such as travel document, national 
identification, mobile transaction system, among others, users’ concerns about privacy and 
security risks of biometric data template in the database remain a big study issue (Avoine, 
Kalach & Quisquater, 2008; Jeng & Chen, 2009). Because the storage data template in the 
database can be replaced with impersonator’s trait. The impostor can generate spoofing from 
the unique trait to obtain illegitimate entry to genuine individual’s data, i.e., Health history. 
The impostor can use the stolen genuine template of an individual to counterfeit documents 
and in return, results into Denial-of-service (DoS) for that particular individual (Ghouzali et 
al., 2016; Riaz, Alfred & Khan, 2018). The fact that, the biometrics data template cannot be 
altered or replaced like passwords and PINs, creates a chance for an impostor to modify and 
substitute the genuine biometric data template with the fake one (Arjunwadkar, Kulkarni & 
Shahu, 2012).  
Several approaches for securing template database have been suggested. Yang, Wang, Hu, 
Zheng and Valli (2019) surveyed the security and accuracy of fingerprint-based biometric 
template to identify vulnerability attacks to template database. Rosenberger (2018) discussed 
the valuation of biometric template protection mechanism based on a transformation. 
Maniroja and Sawarkar (2013) discussed biometric database safety using public key 
cryptography of biometric authentication systems. Mwema, Kimani and Kimwele (2015) 
analyzed the methods and measures intended for safeguarding biometric fingerprint 
templates.  
Nevertheless, most of the study did not report the common weakness related to privacy and 
security risks, where biometric information in the database is retrieved without the user's 
awareness; unauthorized party succeeding in recovering plaintext reference of biometric data 
template in the database and users traceability, where an adversary can trace user's 
authentication attempts to access the system. This research suggested solutions based on 
encryption-decryption algorithm on cryptographic module, where biometric information can 
be encrypted using multiFernet key generated from the Fernet keys instance to guarantee that 
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the biometric data template stored in the database is secure and difficult for a fraud to beat or 
break through. 
1.3 Rationale of the study  
The future to sustain the identity and preserve the individual rights and freedom depends on 
how effectively users can deal with the information they share and the methods of attack that 
are being made by technological change. This study described the fear of users of biometric 
technology (biometric passport) and countermeasures to protect and ensure the biometric data 
template in the database. Use of poorly unprotected biometric template database can create 
loopholes for an attacker to compromise (Imamverdiyev, Teoh & Kim, 2013). 
Given the above argument, lawmakers need to produce a thoroughgoing inspection to spot 
vital issues associated with the technology. An exhaustive investigation, especially the 
biometric passports, for example, can aid experts and the communities to appreciate the 
dangers required and take advantage of the countermeasures. 
 It’s important for decision-makers and security experts to realize that biometric technologies 
often bring worries of secrecy and civil freedoms amongst the overall public. So, the user’s 
willingness of biometric technology, reliant on the level of confidence in the technology and 
trust with those running the system. Therefore, the researcher sought to put up a more 
effective technique for securing biometric data template in the database against individual 
privacy and security threats. The proposed method ensured that the privacy and security risks 
of the biometric data as well as unauthorized access to database is secured. Because the 
database will block any attacker from unauthorized access and cross verify the attacker based 
on the validation of the ownership i.e., authentication code (AC) and sent a Twilio message to 
user for confirmation. In a current research study, the encryption-decryption algorithm 
renders more secure data protection storage (Maniroja & Sawarkar, 2013).   
1.4 Objectives of the study 
1.4.1 General objective 
The general aim of this research is to develop a secured algorithm to enhance the privacy and 
security template of biometric technology, as the biometric technology applies to many 
different applications, the research is focused within the biometric passport. Because more 
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than 15.277 million Ugandan fingerprints meant for NIC were extracted from the NIRA 
database for voting purpose (Rindai, 2016). Yet the information is integrated with national 
biometric passport application.   
1.4.2 Specific objectives  
The specific aims of the research are:  
(i)  To review the current applications and vulnerabilities of biometric technology.  
(ii)  To analyze the enhanced factors to user’s concerns and knowledge pertaining to 
privacy and security of biometric technology.     
(iii)  To design and develop an algorithm to secure the biometric data template in the 
database. 
(iv)  To validate the developed algorithm of the secured template.  
1.5 Research questions  
In order to carry out the research objectives, the research was guided by the following 
research questions:  
(i)  How secure is biometric technology used in the biometric passport acquisition? 
(ii)  How people’s biometric data are being handled within the permit attainment? 
(iii)  What potential privacy-security dangers and users' fears are related to biometric 
technologies?  
(iv)  What countermeasure do users recommend to protect the biometric data template in 
the database? 
1.6 Significance of the study  
This work significantly contributes to the general knowledge gap intended to recognize the 
relevant user’s fears, like an exposure of personal data, inappropriate data transfer and 
unauthorized access to personal data, as the anticipated concerns and perceived benefits. It 
provides useful and valued material for all participants (i.e., the personal identification 
service providers, administrations, innovators) anticipated to offer individuals this safety 
system in day-to-day activity. It encourages practitioners to carefully consider the potential 
benefits and thoroughly evaluate the risks associated with the implementation of this 
technology. It enables lawmakers and security experts to gain a more suitable and correct 
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decision for the country citizens and communities, because it’s an important aspect of data 
security and secrecy protection. It helps build better policy on how to handle issuing of 
biometric passports as well as minimize the risk and circumvent, abuse of the user data 
(function creep). Lastly, provides useful insight and awareness to users about the safety of the 
data they get and supply throughout recording in everyday government or organization 
application activities.  
1.7 Delineation of the study 
The study is delimited to the followings: 
(i)  The research focused on users’ fears of the biometric technology, taking in mind 
campus students, instructors and passport officer as the aspiration trial. The 
possibility in which penalties can be slightly changed had nationwide ID and driver’s 
license being measured in the large study. 
 
(ii)  The access to data is very difficult to obtain from the security perspective, because 
sensitive private information was not revealed. There was no data record disclosed or 
extracted from the officers to focus on particular scenarios happening.  The study 
only obtained data from the qualitative questionnaires designed to the key 
informants. 
 
(iii)  The evaluation of the algorithm was based on the inputs from the user to express their 
willingness to the ePassport system by considering three factors such as the 
performance, acceptability and the convenience. The possibility to use other testing 




LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction   
The aim of this chapter is to survey the relevant literatures on the biometric technology and 
the mechanism for securing the biometric data in the storage. The review is subdivided into 
six segments: (a) biometric operation mechanism, (b) biometric system performance, (c) 
vulnerability and attacks against biometric technology, (d) privacy and security risks, (e) 
biometric template protection measures and (f) techniques to secure the biometric data 
template in the database. 
2.2 Biometric operational mechanisms  
Biometric relies on two fundamental mechanism i.e., authentication and identification (Awad 
& Hassanien, 2014; Prabhakar et al., 2003; Xi & Hu, 2010). The authentication is mainly to 
determine if a person is who she or he claims to be, for instance, an individual requires an 
active participation to cash a check. While identification, by contrast, capture a person’s 
biometric data, for instance, an airport boarding gate, then compares it with the data template 
stored in a database looking for a match. The biometric encompasses four (4) modules: 
sensor module (enrollment unit), characters extraction, data record in the storage, and 
identical unit (Latha & Rameshkumar, 2013; Yang et al., 2019). The sensor module obtains 
the individual’s biometric sample to produce its digital representation, for instance, digital 
webcam for facial or scanner for fingerprint. The thumbprints (minutiae) are extracted to 
acquire the biometric sample via a feature extractor module (algorithm software). These 
features are saved as template data. The identical unit is answerable to get either like or 
unlike score.  For instance, Alice registers her biometric data (fingerprint) with a desired 
server. The biometric data template is created for Alice and stored on central server or a 
device (Smart card) for the purpose of comparability in the confirmation phase. During the 
validation, Alice can provide another biometric sample, which is then compared with the data 
template in the server or device, if the current sample matches with the data template, she is 
granted access or refuse service (Xi & Hu, 2010; Yang et al., 2019). Figure 1 indicated the 




Figure 1: Enrollment and verification of the biometric authentication process (Yang et al., 
2019) 
In Uganda, the biometric technologies are used in several private and public applications, 
such as law enforcement, migration border, customer or dormitory houses, and monetary 
facilities (Awad & Hassanien, 2014; Zheng, Fang, Shankaran & Orgun, 2015; Zheng et al., 
2017; Zheng, Shankaran, Orgun, Qiao & Saleem, 2017).  
In the law enforcement, the biometric technology is embraced across the globe for its 
efficiency in security. At present, it has been launched as an international revolution in many 
nations, like the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and China (Yang et al., 2019).  
In the border control, biometric technology is used to avert counterfeit documents and 
strengthen the border security. Several countries employ biometric technology for securing 
control of travelers across borders. By 2020, 90% of the 35 million Australia, will cross via a 
paperless biometric recognition system. In March 2016, the East African Community (EAC), 
directed the implementation of biometric permit in partner nations (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda) having a one-year period for the present nationwide and 
public passport. The purpose is to strengthen internal security and perimeter control 
(Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control, 2012).  
In consumer, biometric technology is used in the marketplace, like gate locks, monitoring 
application, and moveable devices (cellular phones, laptops etc.). This utilized biometrics as a 
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winning combination in the consumer marketplace, allowing the technology to become more 
widely accepted. 
In financial services, biometric technology is used in protecting the money of every 
individual in the banks etc., such as, cash machineries with thumbprint readers presently 
installed around urban station to improve the clients’ ease in transaction and safety. 
The attack on September 11, 2001, in the United States of America (USA) cautioned 
governments worldwide to handle and review the safety of border control (Vakalis, 2011), 
thus, prompts the governments nationwide to embrace biometric passport (ePassport) for 
border security control.  
2.3 Biometric system performance  
The biometric system performance comprised of two error cases i.e., matching and 
acquisition errors (Ailisto, Lindholm, Mäkelä & Vildjiounaite, 2004).  
2.3.1 The matching error  
The matching error consists of the following: 
(i)  False Acceptance Rate (FAR): Mistaking biometric sample from two dissimilar 
individuals to be from the same individual. The FAR measure the likelihood that the 
biometric system accepts an impostor or it fails to turn down an unauthorized person. 
It’s shown as the percentage of accepting an unauthorized user by the biometric 
system, known as False Match Rate (FMR). The formula is given below: 
 
(ii)  False Reject Rate (FRR): Mistaking biometric samples from the same individual to be 
from two different individuals. The FRR measure the likelihood that the biometric 
security system turned away an already enrolled genuine user. In such case system 
falsely refuses to take an already enrolled person, known as False Non-Match Rate 




(iii)  Genuine Accept Rate (GAR): The percentage of times, an enrolled user is successfully 
recognized by the system. The formula is given below: 
 
When choosing a biometric solution, there is need to discover what the FRR is at the said 
FAR. When a biometric solution provider claims to deliver a very low FAR, it is important to 
find out what is the FRR at this low FAR. In a practical scenario a low FAR and a high FRR 
would ensure that any unauthorized individual will not be permitted access. It would as well 
entail that the authorized people will induce to put their fingers along the device several times 
before they are granted access. So, it is just to hold a very low FAR, but recollect that if this 
low FAR is coming at the price of high FRR then the resolution needs to be re-assessed. 
Figure 2 summarized the error rates. 
2.3.2 The acquisition error 
The acquisition error comprised the following:   
(i)  Failed to capture rate (FTC): Proportion of attempts for which a biometric system is 
unable to see a sample of adequate quality. It’s the chance that the scheme fails to 
discover an input given right biometric samples.  
(ii)  Failed to enroll rate (FTE): Probability of the user, for which the biometric system is 
unable to generate reference data template of enough quality. This is normally served 
by lower quality inputs. This includes those who, for physical or behavioral motives, 
are unable to give the required biometric feature (Latha & Rameshkumar, 2013).  
(iii)  Equal error rate (EER): The point on the curves plot of false accept rate versus false 











Figure 2: (a) False match rate and false non-match rate for a given threshold t (b) The curve 
linking FMR to FNMR (Prabhakar et al., 2003) 
Note: The biometric technology involved the following error rates: Failed Match Rate (FMR) 
and Failed Non-Match Rate (FNMR). The FMR is the proportion where the scores are larger 
than or equivalent to t. While the FNMR is the proportion where the scores are less than t.  
The curve linking FMR to FNMR is denoted as Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC).  
Jain et al. (2007) compared the biometric technology characters (e.g., facial, irises, and 
voice), it is found that fingerprint-based identification schemes are most considered than 
other biometric traits. Maio et al. (2013) stated that the verification correctness of 
thumbprint-based application is actual high-reaching. Table 1 summarized the comparison of 








Table 1: Comparison of biometric characteristics (H=high, M=medium, L=low) 
 
2.4 The vulnerability and attacks against biometric technology  
Latha and Rameshkumar (2013) presented that biometric technology can be invaded by 
outsiders or illegal persons. The situation relates the system administrator as an insider attack 






































































DNA H H H L H L L - - 
Ear M M H M M H M - - 
Facial H H L H M H L 1% 20% 
Finger-print M H H M H M M 0.94% 0.99% 
Gait M L L H L H M - - 
Hand geometry M M M M M M L 2% 2% 
Iris H H H M H L L 2% 2% 
Keystroke L L L M L M M - - 
Palmprint M H H M H M M - - 
Retina H H M L H L L - - 
Signature L L L H L H H - - 
Voice M L L M L H H 2% 10% 
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Figure 3: The vulnerabilities and attacks of the biometric technology (Yang et al., 2019) 
Note: AP indicates an attack point.  
2.4.1 Direct and indirect attack 
The attack in the technology is characterized into two, namely direct and indirect attack 
(Marcel, Nixon & Li, 2014). In the direct attack, an adversary executes the attacks by 
offering the biometric features of a registered user from the sensor interface to obtain access 
as an authorized user. The attacker makes the input device straightaway. Figure 3 showed the 
point of attacks, one, two and sixteen (Akhtar, Micheloni & Foresti, 2015).  
Galbally, Cappelli, Lumini, Maltoni and Fierrez (2008) performed vulnerability of fingerprint 
validation in contrast to direct attack using forged thumbprints obtained from minutia 
templates, applying the FVC2006 DB2 database with International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) minutia-based matcher. The finding indicated that 75% has direct 
access (Galbally et al., 2010). Furthermore, Matsumoto, Yamada and Hoshino (2002) 
verified eleven unlike thumbprint believed coming from gummy (gelatin) thumbprints. 
Because an insider is indirectly involved in these types of attack. The individual can intercept 
the data sent over the communication channel and targets the inner factors of the biometric 
system to manipulate the stored data template. Figure 3 indicated the attack point AP 1, AP 2, 




The repudiation is the denial or refusal of the approved system. The attacker denies having 
accessed the application. Figure 3 specified the attack point 16. 
2.4.3 Coercion 
The coercion is the legal user unknowingly being instructed by impostor to allow entree to 
the biometric application (Nandakumar, Jain & Nagar, 2008; Ratha, Connell & Bolle, 2001). 
The impostor utilizes the biometric application with the user’s biometric data for monetary 
transactions.   
2.4.4 Administrative fraud 
The administrative fraud happens when user assist putting or revealing secret information of 
the organization. It involves the following: 
(i)  Collusion: Where administrator is an impostor to change the access rights of an 
allowed operator. 
(ii)  Failed membership: Where administrator helps enroll the impostor into the 
application. The decision maker is pleased with a huge kickback for the unlawful 
enrolment for first appearance. 
(iii)  Oversight: Where administrator aid the invader entree as a registered user. Changes 
the verge to an inferior rate so the opponent can get the advantage. 
2.4.5 Sensor attacks 
In the sensor attacks, Latha and Rameshkumar (2013) indicated that the intruder present fake 
fingerprint to the sensor to produce lawful image. The impostor puts on face mask cause 
denial-of-service (Pratiba & Shobha, 2013).   
Kang, Lee, Kim, Shin and Kim (2003) applied a number of fingerprint sensors for testing and 
examine if the sensors can eliminate a fake fingerprint film. The results exhibited that the 
fake finger films are assumed by most of the tested sensors. Schuckers (2002) added eleven 
dissimilar fingerprints-based verification systems to forge fingerprint films, the results shown 
that more than 67% probability forged fingerprint films are enrolled in the systems. Kim 
(2017) implemented descriptor image to hold fingerprint liveness detection. It is revealed that 
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forged fingerprints generated no match. With smart phones, care must be taken against 
thumbprint scamming (Yang, Hu, Fernandes, Sivaraman & Wu, 2016). The suggested is 
liveness detection such as the software-based solutions and the hardware-based solutions 
(Schuckers, 2002; Roberts, 2007; Yoon, Feng & Jain, 2012; Yang et al., 2019). 
2.4.6 Character extractor attacks 
The attack involved: 
Override character extractor: This is where, the attacker replaces the characters fearlessly 
(Kamaldeep, 2011; Ratha et al., 2001; Ross, Nandakumar & Jain, 2008). The Trojan horse 
extracts user’s fingerprint samples, then send it to the impostor. The countermeasure is to use 
software detection mechanism to spot the Trojan horse (Yoon et al., 2012).  
2.4.7 Attack on database template  
The invader marks the storage record straightaway via a visibly conceded application to 
mount denial-of-service (Arjunwadkar et al., 2012; Habibu & Sam, 2018; Poongodi & Betty, 
2014). Figure 3 characterized point eight attack.  
Study by Gobi and Kannan (2014) indicated that, the storage database is the most area 
targeted by impostor. Because the biometric data template can be infringed and revised (Xi & 
Hu, 2010). Brindha and Natarajan (2012) pointed that, the biometric data in the database can 
be replaced by an invader’s pattern to attain illegal access to biometric application. Mwema, 
Kimwele and Kimani (2015) and Raju, Vidyasree and Madhavi (2014) observed a bluffing 
attack as one of the problems in the biometric data template storage.  
Manvjeet and Sanjeev (2010) argued that, the possible exploitation of biometric data 
templates can be used for other purpose than the original planned aim, because the data can 
be used for extra aim. Therefore, underprivileged to person’s consent. For example, 
thumbprint obtained can be utilized to  search for an illegal thumbprint for wrong check in 
financial sector (Prabhakar et al., 2003).  
The four vulnerability attacks in database templates are:  
(i)  The template being replaced by an invader’s template to obtain illegal access. 
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(ii)  The physical spoof can be produced or generated from the template to gain illegal 
access to the organization data as well as other schemes that employ similar 
biometric feature. 
(iii)  The stolen template can be replayed or reiterated to the matcher to gain illicit access. 
(iv)  The template can be used for cross-matching across dissimilar database records. 
Li and Kot (2011) presented a secrecy security measure. In their study, user’s identity is 
concealed. Elkamchouchi et al. (2018) recommended a technique of cryptography utilizing 
the image as a public key and arbitrary numbers as a secret key to compute the pixel. Liu, Li, 
Cao and Chen (2017) considered cryptographic system of secret transmission to encode a 
decoded message. The authors suggested cancellable biometrics and biometric cryptosystem 
to protect the template (Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2008). An online platform, EvaBio, for 
the security assessment is discussed (El-Abed, Lacharme & Rosenberger, 2012). Table 2 















Table 2: The possible attacks with reference to Fig. 3 attack point (Yang et al., 2019) 
Attack 
point 
Target component Possible attacks Countermeasures References 







Marcel,  and 
Fierrez, (2015) 
 
2 Biometric input device Denial of service Rugged devices Jain et al. (2008) 
 
3 Communication path 








Jain et al. (2008) 
4 Character extractor module Trojan horse attack, 
Override feature 
extractor 




Jain et al. (2008) 
5 Communication amongst 
character extractor and 
template safety methods 
  
Replay attacks Trial/reply based 
application. 
Shelton et al. 
(2012) 
6 Template protection 
techniques  
Side channel attacks Masking, designing ICs 
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Usage of robust 
confirmed 
procedures 
Ross, Shah, and 
Jain. (2005) 
8 Template database Steal, delete, change, 
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10 Communication amongst 
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11 Matched Side channel attack, 








































14 Communication amongst 
decision module and 
biometric application 
Zero-effort attack 
(False match error) 
Design robust matcher Tams (2013); 




15 Communication amongst 







Design robust matcher Jain et al. (2006) 
 
16 Biometric application (e.g., 
cash dispenser) 
Denial of service 
attack 
CCTV monitoring, 
deploy security guards 




2.5 Privacy and security risks of the biometric technology 
Despite the rapidly growing number of biometric applications, in areas such as bodily and 
physical access control, attendance time, border control, identity documents, financial 
banking, a lot of potential privacy and security risks continues to draw more attention. For 
instance, the privacy and security issue discussed below.  
2.5.1 Privacy issue   
Ang, Safavi-Naini and McAven (2005) indicated that an attack in biometric technology 
targets the data access at the storage database. Simoens, Bringer, Chabanne and Seys (2012) 
distinguished distress as follows:   
(i)  Biometric Sample Recovery: Where an adversary determines a new template 
predictable by the storage server. 
(ii)  Biometric reference recovery: An unauthorized party (adversary) succeeds in 
acquiring the biometric  data template (plaintext) reference from the database. This is 
the greatest destructive privacy threat, because an attacker can obatin unlawful 




Pagnin and Mitrokotsa (2017) indicated the most provoking challenges in the biometric 
authentication system as follows: 
(i)   The refusal of impersonation attacks. 
(ii)   The inevitability of biometric data templates.  
(iii)   Guarantee that individual data remains secret. 
Mordini (2008) presented that the central recording to biometric data is vital to privacy 
matter, because the stored information can be copied or interfered. The sensitive data of the 
individual’s character and health can be exposed. Consequently, soft biometrics need to be 
investigated thoroughly as a way to manage individuals’ information.  
Pagnin and Mitrokotsa (2017) suggested that, the countermeasures to combat the secrecy fear 
is through the use of the cancellable biometrics and bio-hashing (Topcu, Karabat, 
Azadmanesh & Erdogan, 2016).   
2.5.2 Security issue  
Nandakumar and Jain (2008) pointed out that the greatest security problem of the biometric 
technology is the input interface in offering a false biometric representative, such as voice, 
face, signature in which an impostor stages a false biometric trait at the sensor machine. The 
impostor can exchange a fake biometric data with a genuine one during the verification 
context (Jain, Nandakumar & Nagar, 2013). The security vulnerability of biometric is  
instigated by the impersonator exploiting the biometric traits at the sensor machine interface 
(Jain et al., 2008; Nagar, Nandakumar & Jain, 2012; Phillips et al., 2007; Przybocki & 
Martin, 2004; Wilson et al., 2004).  The countermeasure is to provide a liveness recognition 
technique as well as system designers to install security surveillance.  
2.5.3 Weakness of the biometric technology 
The weakness of the biometric technology includes: 
(i)  The biometric data aren’t private. Because hackers can acquire the biometric traits 
such as fingerprint, facial, voices, iris etc., anywhere in restaurants, supermarkets, 
workshops, conferences. With fingerprint recognition you leave fingerprints 
everywhere you go. With voice recognition, someone is recording your voice. 
Essentially, places you visit records and saves your image in its database to identify 
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you and analyze your buying habits. Some images are taken without owners’ consent 
for commercial purposes.  All it takes is for a hacker to breach any of those databases 
to leak and steal your biometric identification. Therefore, Personal Identifiable 
Information (PII) needs to have access control in place to protect one from identity 
theft.  
(ii)  The biometric data template in the database are hackable, once an impostor has an 
image of someone’s fingerprint, facial, or iris, they can easily gain access to the 
accounts. The Apple’s TouchID was broadly accepted as a biometric advancement, 
famous hacker Jan Krissler was able to hack the technology just a day after the 
iPhone was released. Likewise, researchers from the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) 
created fake fingers to unlock iPhones. 
(iii)  Since biometric technology reveals part of a user’s identity, if stolen, it can be used to 
forge legal documents, passports, or criminal records, which can do more damage 
than a stolen credit card number. Biometric companies are aware of these errors in 
the technology and should aim to improve identification. Therefore, multi-factor 
authentication can help reduce the fraud.  
2.6 Biometric template protection measures 
Jain et al. (2005) explained that the biometric data template protection ensures that, data are 
not revealed or replayed and makes it hard for an attacker to reverse engineer the stored data 
(Pratiba & Shobha, 2013; Radha & Karthikeyan, 2010).  
Busch (2012) categorized the ISO/IEC 24 745 standard into three i.e., non-invertibility, 
revocability and unlikeable (Al-Saggaf & Acharya, 2013; Nandakumar & Jain, 2015). Tigga 
and Wanjari (2013) classified the biometric template measures into two (2) categories i.e.,  
hardware and software-based. The hardware-based method comprised of the smart cards or 
match-on-card. While the software-based keeps a reviewed disclosed data. Because, users 
carry the card every other time. 
Despite the hardware and software-based protection template, Nandakumar and Jain (2015), 
Sandhya, Prasad and Chillarige (2016) and Simoens et al. (2012), broadly categorized the 
biometric template protection further into feature transformation and biometric cryptosystem. 
The feature conversion method is further categorized as a salting-based method and non-
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invertible method. Whereas the biometric cryptosystem approach is categorized as key 
binding and key generation method. Figure 4 presented the various stages of the protection 
techniques. 
 
Figure 4: Categorization of the biometric template protection scheme (Joshi, Mazumdar & 
Dey, 2018) 
2.6.1 Hardware-based level   
In the hardware level safety, the data templates are achieved and rendered to avoid 
interception and interfering of patterns. A tamper-proof prohibits an invader from 
infringement into the system, like matcher, to steal a private key and thus prevent illegal 
entree. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is developed by Trusted Computing Group 
(TCG) as platform that comprises extra hardware and software to rise the security level of 
Information Technology (IT) systems (Alshar’e, Zin, Sulaiman & Mokhtar, 2015).  
2.6.2 Software-based level  
In the software level, it mostly focused in the storage of the data template kept in the database 
in a coded form. This makes it very difficult for an invader to break through the enciphered 
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key. The application involved the cryptosystems, data template creation utilizing character 
conversions. 
2.6.3 The feature transformation  
Pratiba and Shobha (2013) indicated that the template in feature transformation is distorted 
using the user’s password during the enrolment and the same password in the transformed 
query before being fitted with the transformed template. The transformed function is gained 
through the biometric template. Then saved in the database. Christian and Christoph (2012) 
argued that, the element of the transformed function is acquired from an arbitrary mystery 
key or password. And so, the same transformed function is localized in the feature query and 
matched against the transformed template. Gaddam and Lal (2010) discussed various 
transformation functions available such as, bio-hashing (Topcu, Erdogan, Karabat & 
Yanikoglu, 2013), cancellable biometric (Patel, Ratha & Chellappa, 2015) and biometric 
salting (Jain et al., 2008). 
(i) The bio-hashing   
Armoogum and Oozeer (2016) and Mwema et al. (2015) indicated that the bio hashing is 
transformed and defined with a secret key only known to the user. The key is securely hidden 
away and recalled for subsequent authentication this increases entropy of biometric 
templates, and deters adversary attacks. The biometric data is used to compute a binarized 
key of 80 bit keys with 0.93% false rejection rate (Radha & Karthikeyan, 2010). The key can 
be used in smartcard or Universal Serial Bus (USB) tokens (Gobi & Kannan, 2014).   
The major drawback of bio-hashing is the reduced routine where the genuine token is 
recovered and delivered by a rival claiming to be a lawful operator (Minakshi, RupKumar, 
Deepjyoti & Rupam, 2012).  Jin, Ling and Goh (2004) presented two-factor authentication 
technique for bio-hashing. The analysis done by Nagar, Nandakumar and Jain (2010) 
indicated that bio-hashing is susceptible to interference since it is quite easy to acquire unique 
pattern. 
(ii) Cancelable biometrics 
Ratha, Connell and Bolle (2001) pointed that, in cancelable biometrics, the original data 
template is rendered by non-invertible conversion in the starting point and the sample data in 
the authentication level. Ratha, Chikkerur, Connell and Bolle (2007) introduced three 
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different transformation functions. The suggested transformed function deliberately 
misrepresents the original features, making it complex to retrieve raw data template. 
Yang, Jiang and Kot (2009) formed cancelable templates using nearby and universal 
characteristics. The nearby features comprised of the reserved and comparative viewpoints 
amongst minutiae sets, while universal characters comprised of alignment and ridge 
frequency.  Yang, Hu, Wang and Wu (2018) suggested a multimodal cancelable biometric 
system that fuses fingerprint features and finger-vein features to achieve better recognition 
accuracy and higher security.  
Dwivedi and Dey (2019) suggested a hybrid combination system to assimilate cancelable 
fingerprint and iris modalities to lessen restrictions in each person modality. Investigational 
effects exhibit high performance improvement over their unimodal counterpart. Unlike 
passwords, PINs and access codes, biometric template can never be replaced by youngster if 
compromised.  
To circumvent these risks, cancellable biometrics are introduced where biometric templates 
can be cancelled and substituted (Patel et al., 2015; Radha & Karthikeyan, 2010). The 
cancelable biometrics resolves secrecy-related applications as it averts the system to stash 
away the unique biometric characters of the operator.  
According to Rathgeb and Uhl (2011) cancelable biometrics has got its challenges, if 
transformed biometric data is compromised, transformation parameter changes to deter 
adversaries from tracing and cross-matching users’ templates, if transformational parameter 
are known to hackers, it’s insecure, because it reduces recognition accuracy due to the high 
variance brought about by the distorted data when transformation is applied on users’ 
biometric data (Du, Yang & Zhou., 2011).  
(iii) Biometric salting  
Sandhya et al. (2016) indicated that a user-specific data is linked with the biometric data to 
obtain the partial version. Depending on the exterior supplementary data, the technique is 
revocable only by switching the word. This evokes a grave security issue, because the user-
specific data can be stolen or compromised. In the event of non-invertible transformation, the 
biometric sample is distorted by giving a one-way non-invertible role, the parameter of the 
transformation is altered to provide adaptable templates. The translation is performed through 
sign area or in feature field. Patel et al. (2015) pointed out that, the benefit of the non-
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invertible convert is that the fraud can’t rebuild the unique biometric data even if the converts 
are approved, non-invertible transformation increases the performance reduction due to 
information loss and difficulty in arrangement of the data templates.   
2.6.4 Biometric cryptosystem  
Supriya and Manjunatha (2014) stated that the cryptosystem is encoded using an encoded key 
derived from a password. The stored data is decrypted using the matching decrypted key 
correspond to the captured query for the authentication. The data is kept in the helper data to 
prevent expose of any important message in the biometric template. Meanwhile the encode 
key can be mixed out after generating the secure template, thus, an attacker can’t replace or 
exchange the existing encrypted template even if the decryption key is stolen. 
The cryptosystem is divided into stages i.e., cryptographic of secret key from a data template 
(Kholmatov & Yanikoglu, 2006). A biometric cryptosystem output a key by either attaching 
it with the biometric features, such as Fuzzy Commitment (FC) (Ari-Juels & Wattenberg, 
1999). Fuzzy Vault (FV) (A-Juels & Sudan, 2002; Uludag, Pankanti & Jain, 2005). Or 
straightaway creating the key from the biometric characters, for instance, Fuzzy Extractor 
(FE) (Dodis, Reyzin & Smith, 2004).  
(i) Key binding   
In a key binding, the key is combined with assistant data in the registration stage 
(Imamverdiyev et al., 2013). Figure 5 summarized the basic concept of biometric key 
binding. The key binding involves the following: Fuzzy Vault and Fuzzy Commitment 










Figure 5: Basic concept of biometric key binding (Joshi et al., 2018) 
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(ii) Fuzzy vault   
According to Geetika (2013) a biometric FV is used for protecting private key, releasing 
them only when the legitimate users enter the correct biometric data.  It encrypts the secret 
information, then decrypt it using a fuzzy unordered set of genuine and half points. 
Meenakshi and Padmavathi (2010) revealed that fuzzy vault eliminates key management 
problem found in the practical cryptosystem. Hooda and Gupta (2013) indicated that fuzzy 
vault is prone to the following limitations, difficulty in revoking a compromised vault, which 
is prone to cross-matching of biometric templates across databases. An attacker can easily 
stage attack after statistically analyzing points in the vault. It’s possible for an attacker to 
replace the original biometric features with fake one, thus, beating vault authentication. If the 
unique template of the legitimate user is temporarily exposed, the attacker can glean the 
template during the exposure.  
(iii) Fuzzy commitment   
Jeny and Jangid (2013) indicated that the biometric traits in fuzzy commitment are 
characterized in binary vector or uniform random key of length 1 bit, generated and used to 
fully index an n-bit code of error correcting code. In which a sketch extracted is stored in a 
database. Geethanjali, Thamaraiselvi and Priyadharshini (2012) compared the different 
between fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault. They indicated that, fuzzy commitment is 
characterized as binary vectors, divided into various segments where each segment is 
securely separated. While in fuzzy vault the biometric trait is given as a set of securely 
hidden data (Al-Saggaf & Acharya 2013; Schmitt & Jordaan, 2013).   
Liu and Zhao (2017) used 11 minimum number points to protect the thumbprint templates 
and kept them in encoded form. Thumbprint matching is conducted in the encoded field and 
validation is positive only when the query thumbprint is close to the fingerprint template 
(Cappelli, Ferrara & Maltoni, 2010). 
2.7 Techniques to secure data storage  
The data in the databases are the greatest and harmful attacks that cause serious consequences 
for users. The biometric information is usually registered and compared with the stored 
information in the confirmation phase. There are serious fears of users with utilization of the 
biometric data. Because an impostor can hijack the biometric information in the storage to 
26 
 
attain unlawful access to the biometric system. To secure the biometric data template in the 
database, a range of techniques has been proposed by different scholars to secure biometric 
data template and database (Mm & Gr, 2017). 
Jain et al. (2005) and Emmanuel et al. (2016) suggested the shorthand to hide the raw 
biometric data whose purpose is to transfer the data. The method prevented a skimmer from 
understanding delicate information (Patel et al. 2015). This condensed the template conceded 
and resolved the genuine replacement of a secrecy issues for matching against distorted 
vector, as well as, averts the application from keeping the new biometric characters of the 
user.   
Pratiba and Shobha (2013) anticipated a watermarking method to watermark the data in the 
biometric template database. Setting aside the honesty of the substance to be shown, when 
recovered for identical. The pixel rate skins the watermark data (Malhotra & Kant, 2013). In 
case an impostor attempts to substitute the safe biometric data template, the system signal 
from the server for wrong trials attempts (Anitha, Rao, Rajasekhar & Krishna, 2017).  
Nandakumar and Jain (2015) proposed the fuzzy vault design using thumbprint and iris. The 
study revealed that multi-biometric vault in thumbprints and iris achieved 98.2% of the GAR 
at 0.01% FAR. The equivalent GAR rate of the individual’s iris and thumbprints vaults is 
88% and 78.8% respectively. The safety of the system is 41 bits and that of the thumbprint 
and iris has provided 49 bits of security (Gomez-Barrero, Maiorana, Galbally, Campisi & 
Fierrez, 2017; Khan, Akbar, Shahzad, Farooq & Khan, 2015).  
Ashish and Sinha (2016) suggested the utilization of string re-arrangement to ease the safety 
of the template database. The biometric information is encoded and castoff after creating the 
easy template. During the check, the stored information is decoded using the private key and 
checked contrary to the token request. The obstruction to the encoded-based strategy, is the 
unprotected key controller, which showed the decoded private key to the machine for each 
certification. The benefit is the matching process hired for sustaining the similar correctness 
(Rathgeb, Gomez-Barrero, Busch, Galbally & Fierrez, 2015; Simoens et al., 2012).  
Manvjeet and Sanjeev (2010) suggested encryption-decryption algorithm to secure the 
fingerprint image incorporated with a password. The password involved the mathematical 
value of any length, and image of any size using polynomial function  where 
  (AlTarawneh, Woo & Dlay, 2008). The 
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effects were studied on a database containing 50 images of fingerprint templates, 50 images 
of any biometric traits or whatever other information needed to decode or decrypt and a word 
needed for private key generation. The findings showed that the developed technique gives 
96% security when 50 images of biometric traits are encrypted and decrypted with 50 
different passwords. And 100% security when the 50 images of biometric traits are encrypted 
and decrypted by using one image of fingerprint template and 50 different passwords. 
Nagar et al. (2012) proposed liveness detection mechanism in preventing the outbreaks 
attack. The authors implemented liveness detection using software and hardware. The extra 
hardware obtained life signs for recognition, for instance, face to face movement. The 
disadvantage is that, more hardware is required that makes it extremely expensive 
(Panigrahy, Jena, Korra & Jena, 2009). To address the secrecy and security issue of an 
individual’s biometric data, a fingerprint and facial image are integrated using the 
cryptographic module based on the Fernet keys instance of the encryption-decryption 
algorithm to protect the biometric database. In this, the identity of an individual is firmly 
protected.  
In general, the study introduced an overview of the biometric operation mechanism and its 
performance and then went on to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks as well as privacy-
security issues and the weakness. It is realized that, most of the impostors targeted the 
biometric data template in the database. The biometric data template in the database can be 
hacked, once an impostor has an image of someone’s fingerprint, facial, or iris. The impostor 
can easily gain access to their accounts, reveals part of a user’s identity, and if stolen, it can 
be used to forge legal documents, passports, or criminal records, which can do more damage 
than a stolen credit card number. 
However, several methods were discussed, for instance, the cancelable biometrics to enhance 
the trustworthiness of the biometric data template, the bio-hashing to transform and define 
data with a secret key only known to the user, biometric salting to define user-specific data 
linked with the biometric data, fuzzy vault  for protecting private key and release them once 
the legitimate users enters the correct biometric data and fuzzy commitment to generate 
binary vector or uniform random key of length 1 bit. It was discovered that, there is no totally 
foolproof of security scheme that guaranteed the protection of the biometric data template in 
the database. Therefore, no biometric system is optimal. The determination as to which 
biometric technology is to be used should be prepared on the foundation of the operation and 
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the degree of protection required. The research, therefore, addressed the common weakness 
related to: 
(i)  Privacy and security risks, where biometric information in the database is retrieved 
without user's awareness.  
(ii)  Unauthorized thirdy party, succeeding in recovering the plaintext reference of 
biometric data template in the database. 
(iii)  Users traceability, where an adversary can trace user's authentication and tries to 
access the biometric data in the database system. 
The study, therefore, suggested the encryption-decryption algorithm linking to the 
cryptographic module incorporating the Fernet keys instance.  The cryptographic module 
integrated the biometric traits (fingerprint and facial image) with persons biodata, to produce 
an encrypted byte and a text file. These files are securely saved in the database incorporated 
with Twilio short message service (SMS) message. The Twilio SMS message is auto-
generated directly from the database to alerts the user and the officer in circumstance an 
attacker attempts to access the database, it can block the attacker from unauthorized access 
and cross verify the attacker based on the validation of the ownership, i.e., authentication 
code. With this approach, users biometric data is more secured and harder for an impostor to 




MATERIALS AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduced the most substantial component of any research work, because it 
described the attainment questions. The determination of the learning is to create an 
impression to individual skills and worries of the application system in Uganda and to 
develop secured procedure for protecting the biometric data in the storage. The chapter 
defined study design, population and sample technique, data collection, case study and 
documentation, data analysis, validity and reliability as well as ethical consideration. 
3.2 Study design  
The study adopted investigation tactic since it’s flexible for online inquiries. Coded requests 
are offered through surveys. The initial survey is introduced, explained and ideas given by 
experts. The questions are altered, formulated and tested out via a few samples (pilot-trial). 
The results of the pre-trials are utilized to remove, redesign new questionnaires.  
3.3 Population and sampling procedure  
The respondents surveyed are persons holding travel permits and officers at migration 
currently processing the permits exercise. The stratified random sample is utilized to draw the 
target goal. The formula below is used to draw the subgroup or strata within the population 
and to ensure that the presence of the key subgroup is selected, makes it more precise, 
accurate and better estimate of the population. The formula  is deployed for 
the sample size (Shalabh, 2014). By using this approach to find the sample size, it is 
anticipated that the degree of bias can be fixed and the measurements of sampling error 
becomes low. The method selected account for the extrapolation of the results from the study 
of the whole population. 
3.4 Data collection   
The research deployed a qualitative and quantitative questionnaire that captured data 
pertinent to the research’s objective in the four regions of Uganda: Central, Eastern, Northern 
and Western. The questions involved four levels: social-demographic characteristic of the 
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respondents, like the respondent’s age, gender, skill level and type of respondents. The 
second, attributed to the influences affecting individuals worry of biometric technology. 
Third, safety intimidations of the technology. Finally, suggested countermeasure. Unlimited 
questionnaires are utilized for the study.  The closed questions are used to collect data to 
avoid ambiguity data in situations of non-conforming selected choices of the questions given 
to the answerers. Other reasons are, to get qualified focused responses over which study 
questions can be replied. Meanwhile the survey is automatically dispersed, it confined the 
participants to response the questions accurately and with less time-consuming as related to 
the open survey.   
3.5 The case studies and documentation 
The case study and documentation review approach were used for the public available 
documents. The documents included the mission statements, annual reports, guides and 
strategic plans as well as personal documents such as the Journals, blogs, event reports, 
newspapers and physical evidence like brochures, posters, reference works and training 
materials. The case study and document analysis are an effective and efficient way to collect 
data because they allow revealing a deeper understanding of the existing literature because 
they are clearer, more accessible, more reliable, less expensive and more cost-effective than 
other methods (Bowen, 2009; O’Leary, 2004) 
3.6 Data analysis  
The study used RStudio and the Statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 20.000 
for data analysis. The SPSS enabled to extract data from the table. While RStudio was used to 
manipulate the statistical modeling and graphics. A chi-square value below 0.050 was used to 
measure the significance differences based on chi-square test. The investigator tabulated the 
raw information gathered from the participants utilizing the surveys to describe the graphs. 
This is suitable in that, the description of similar answers utilized the same tactic of 
expressive study and to twist the raw facts into important data for policymaking and 
recommendation. Beside analysis, the investigator deployed new tactic of encryption-
decryption algorithm using the design pattern of MVT as solution to secure the biometric data 
in database. The algorithm is based on the cryptographic module of Fernet keys instance, 
where two Fernet keys are combined to generate a multiFernet key for the encryption. The 
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software’s installed are Jinja2, Wtforms, SQLAlchemy, Cryptography, Twilio SMS using a 
python flask as the web development platform.  
3.7 Validity and reliability 
The validity is the degree to which an assessment measures what it says to measure (Stake, 
2010; Golafshani, 2003). It is extremely important that an evaluation is valid so that the 
results are applied and interpreted correctly. According to Golafshani (2003) reliability is the 
degree of agreement of results over time. The results are said to be reliable if similar results 
can be simulated using the same methodology, then it is known that the research tools are 
reliable. To ensure the validity and reliability of the study, data were collected using various 
techniques (interviews, case study, documentation analysis, direct observation, participant 
observation, and experiments) from different expertise (Directorate of migration officers, 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) experts, and receptionists). This aided to 
obtain information from multiple angles and increased the legality of the information 
required. 
3.8 Ethical consideration 
The investigator obtained a permission from the School of CoCSE at the NM-AIST Arusha, 
Tanzania and the MU administration office Arua, Uganda who addressed the letter directly to 
the Minister of internal affairs office for conducting the study in different regions/centers of 
the migrations and border controls (Appendix 3 and 4).  
The investigator requested for the permission to use the research instruments such as cameras 
during observation, recording during the interview, photos and narrations from respondents 
for the study purpose. The researcher adhered to the ethical principles that included respect 
for the privacy and the person, honesty, integrity and confidentiality. According to Berg 
(2008), ensuring confidentiality is critical if the researcher expects to get truthful and free-




RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1 Introduction  
In this section, results from the survey were conducted. The discussion of the analysis based 
on users' concerns of biometric technology is presented. The encryption-decryption algorithm 
implemented to secure the biometric data template in the database are explained in detail. The 
graphical illustration of the respondents is presented to infer the results in a more serious 
manner.  
4.2 Social demography characteristic  
This section sought to determine the participant’s conceptions about the general population 
concerning biometric technology usage and the wider knowledge of experience. The details 
included gender, age and biometric feature experience as well as the security of the biometric 
data.  
Three-hundred-and-eighty-four (n=384) participants are documented holders, while thirty-
three (n=33) respondents are issuance officers. The 74% of the participants are male and 26% 
are female respectively for the passport holders. While 69.7% and 30.3% are male and female 
equally for the issuance officer. Sixty-five percent (65%) are mostly of the old year, above 
the age of 30 and 35% are between the age of 21 and 30. The motive behind this, is to take an 
impression of the general public about the utilization of the biometric application.  
The foremost participants are from the university communal, hold formal prerequisite higher 
than Advanced level for passport holders (BSc., MSc. and PhD) and officers at the district 
centers in the event of issuance officers. Forty-point-six percent (40.6%) are undergraduates, 
37.2% are training staff and 22.1% are workers. This is to evaluate if the participants are 
mindful and knew about the new technology applied in the biometric passport.  
No substantial variations in participants’ features amongst the three groups were observed 
(chi-square value = 0.002). The wider information and expertise in biometric application 
systems used are analyzed. The purpose is to understand if the biometric application used had 
an influence on the acceptance of the users. The 48.5% and 53% of the participants have wide 
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range of skills in fingerprint, 31.3% and 36% for face image, 9% and 4% for iris, 5% and 3% 
for palm image, lastly six-point-two-percent (6.2%) and four-percent (4%) for voice.  
The participants indicated the usage of the biometric technology in the workstation, 
countrywide registration among others (NIRA-Uganda, 2015). Furthermore, the findings 
showed that despite this high percentage of respondents with a broader expertise knowledge, 
69.3% of the respondents’ agreed that, most organizations are using biometric technology for 
security reasons. Thirty-point-seven percent (30.7%) disagree with the statement, that the 
information can be invaded and misrepresented by an impostor. 
So, a need for person’s mindfulness about the safety and secrecy of the information they 
provide throughout the numerous registrations in everyday events. The results from the 
analysis are summarized as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: The social demography features of the participants (a) Gender, (b) Professionalism, 
(c) Experience on biometric features, (d) Security of biometric 
4.3 Factors determining the acceptance of the biometric application 
This segment showed a link amongst the intellects and moods of the participants about the 
insight of the technology application utilization. It assists the scholar to ascertain the foremost 
worries overdue the use of the biometric technology in order to instruct the expert in 
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understanding the preference of the overall community. The 30.2% of the participants’ 
accepted that the technology help in securing the person’s data from scams. Nonetheless, 
seventeen-point-four percent (17.4%) disagreed with the declaration citing that, the 
technology cannot help in securing frauds and crimes, because the data can be manipulated. 
Also, 2.4% are unbiassed (neither agreed nor disagreed). Although there is a various 
observation of the participants, those who agreed to adopt it, indicated the importance ration 
in contrast to crime and fraud, while those who strongly distressed saying the technology 
cannot aid in stopping fraud and crime against humankind. 
The respondents were questioned on the protection provided by the use of biometric 
passports. The 28% disagreed with the statement. They indicated that this technology cannot 
help offer any security, because the protective equipment can fail to detect against terrorist 
act. However, 37.4% accepted that the technology offers solid validation and enhance safety 
at the border point. Twelve-point-two percent (12.2%) are unbiassed (neither agreed nor 
disagreed).  
Furthermore, participants were questioned of the technology utilized, forty-three-point-five 
percent (43.5%) strongly accepted the technology as a way to prevent and validate the 
holidaymakers at the border entry. The 11.2% strongly disagreed, considered it as a hinderer. 
Hence, creating a fortune for a terrorist to invade the system. Fifty-six-point-five percent 
(56.5%) believed that biometric technology is employed as surveillance to constantly monitor 
crimes against mankind which can help forestall a terrorist onslaught. Seven-point-six percent 
(7.6%) disagreed with the statement.  
Given the knowledge of the respondents about the technology, 41.2% of the participants 
concurred with the statement. Because the biometric data is kept on the passports without the 
holder’s willingness. While 30% did not agree and 7.4% are neutral. 
Therefore, the officers and system operators need to make up-to-date recommendation on the 
acceptance of the technology to ensure safety of employer’s data from frauds. The results for 




Figure 7: Utilization of the biometric passport technology 
4.4 The biometric data secrecy 
A considerable issue of data secrecy and safety compliance is examined on the five-Likert-
point, ranging from ‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’. Information saving is done in the 
range of 1 to 5. The weighted average and statistical numbering of p-value beneath 0.050 are 
estimated. The 80.2% of the participants presented that users’ data cannot be disclosed 
deprived of the holders’ consent, because individual information is of vital economic worth. 
Thus, one demands to identify whom to share the datum with and what is to be done with the 
data. The statistic rate attained is 0.000 and a weighted average of 1.200. Therefore, the 
participants’ declaration is acknowledged. 
Additionally, 57.8% of the participants strongly agreed that individual information should be 
held confidential, because individual data is private and must be secured. Individuals should 
determine to observe the rules against their own information (Singh, 2014). Through any data 
placed available in a community forum, individual cannot assume it’s secret or protection. 
The chi-square value attained is 0.000 and a weighted average of 1.48%. Hence statistically 
substantial.  
The possible misuses of novel knowledge by biometric offenders are explained for validation 
purpose. The 64.8% of the participants strongly accepted that novel technologies can be 
harmed and broken by crooks, since identity theft, counterfeit and fraudster are the actual 
cause. While biometrics technologies aid in security in contrast to the occurrences, the 
possible abuse is noticeable. Anyone unidentified can involve themselves with outsiders and 
exchange information records. Besides, a good figure of workers does not entirely identify 
the threats related to the utilization of new biometric technology. One needs to know that a 
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stolen biometric data cannot be cancelled. The figure value attained is 0.001 and the weighted 
average equals to 1.510. Thus, the participants’ declarations are believed and statistically 
significant. 
The respondents were questioned if glance at a person’s biometric information from the 
database deprived of the owner's consent was a privacy violation. Fifty-four-point-two 
percent (54.2%) strongly accepted the statement, because the violation of one’s private 
secrecy can result into the individual exposer of a medical record (Singh, 2014). The 
proposed is to recruit a transparency and honest person running and getting by the biometric 
system with strict regulations respecting the central and civic liberties. The datum must be 
utilized solely for the aims quantified. The chi-square value attained is 0.002 and a weighted 
average of 2.120. Hence, the participants’ declarations are statistically substantial. 
In advance, participants were quizzed if the biometric data in the database utilized for other 
reasons than the original purpose was a secrecy violation. Sixty-six-point-one percent 
(66.1%) strongly accepted and quoted the 2016 incidence in Uganda as the highest surprise, 
because the voter’s biometric thumbprints was retrieved from the NIRA database without 
owners’ consent. The chi-square value attained is 0.000 and a weighted middling of 1.640. 
Hence, the participants’ declaration is considerably. The researcher hence recommends the 
handlers of the biometric data to be further watchful of users’ privacy and individual data 
distribution. They must visualize that the data is encoded with an authentication key before 
posting them on the available website. The outcome of the analysis is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: The biometric data secrecy 
Questionnaires SA A N D SD WA χ2 Test 
Non-privacy violation 80.2 19.8 0 0 0 1.20 0.000 
New technology abuse 64.8 30.2 0 0 5.2 1.51 0.001 
Personal data secrecy 57.8 39.1 0 3.1 0 1.48 0.000 
Privacy trespass in database 54.2 19.3 3.4 6.3 16.9 2.12 0.002 
Function creep 66.1 24.0 0% 0 9.9 1.64 0.000 
SA = Strongly agreed, A = agreed, N = Neutral, D = Disagreed, SD = Strongly disagreed. The t chi-square 
value beneath 0.050 is significant, the null hypothesis is forbidden while directly overhead 0.050 is not 
significant, the null suggestion is assumed. 
4.5 Factors that influence individuals’ distress of the biometric application 
This section aimed at understanding the causes of individual fears of the biometric passport 
application. The analysis concentrated on identifying participants distress of the technology. 
The 38.8% and 24.2% of the respondents dreaded exposure of individual data, because the 
biometric data can be utilized for other things than the original planned aim. For example, 
migration officers at the airfield scan the physical biometric characters of the travelers for 
recognition against the danger and they necessity a hard drive and internet linking to set out 
the data, thus odors for other purposes. Forty-eight-point-five percent (48.5%) and 30.5% 
dreaded inappropriate data transfer, because the exactly file of a person can be exposed 
against fraud. While the travel archives are kept for comparison purpose, the officer in-charge 
may use it to trace the records provided for different motives in contrast of the data security 
requirement. Thus, the information transfer desired to be supervised. 
Furthermore, 22.9% and 9.1% presented misuse of biometric data, because the stored data 
cannot be cancelled once compromised. Suggested is a need for everyone to be more alert on 
how to protect their identity. It is easy to tell that biometrics are the upcoming security 
verification, but this forthcoming is undefined except rigorous approaches are used to ensure 
the protection of the biometric information against any misuse. Eighteen-point-two percent 
(18.2%) and 7.8% showed unlawful access to private information, because unidentified users 
can obtain the character authorization to someone else’s data and mismanage it, thus deprived 
of the person consensus. For example, a current situation of Pharmacy2U being penalized a 
fine of one-hundred-and-thirty-thousand pound (£130 000) by the information manager for 
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retailing the customers’ particulars to 3rd party deprived of consensus (NPA, 2017). This 
instead brought up the concerns of the user’s privacy and numerous dangers in public 
legislation. The central administration segment, IPP 1, mandate that individual data gathered 
must be for legal targets. Without awareness and user’s concerns, the distress of the biometric 
application adoption shall remain. Thus, technology developers should look into the 
consequence of the end-user’s worries of the biometric application to draw informed 
conclusion. The results from the analysis are presented in Fig. 8. 
 
Figure 8: Factors influencing users fear of the biometric application 
4.6 The security threats of the biometric technology 
This area of the study explained the important underlying component of the biometric threats 
experienced. The attacks concerning the biometric data template in the storage database. In 
the results, 33.3% of the respondents’ specified fraud of the biometric data being the highest 
risk. They indicated that, an impersonator can exchange a fake document to obtain out the 
illegitimate fraudulent movement. The counterfeit contained illegal reproductions of the 
original permits unlawfully factory made, either issued or affirmed. Of the several different 
uniqueness in portable passport documents presented, there is problem to distinguish between 
false and genuine one. Thus, a need for an INTERPOL to provide numerous dedicated 
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gadgets for the commandment's passage to notice fake permits and with dissimilar cohorts to 
amend the degree of safety of authorized permits. 
Furthermore, twenty-seven-point-three percent (27.3%) of the respondents indicated the 
removal and replacement of permit sheets. This is linked with impostors looking forward to 
alter the genuine permit information sheets of the legitimate holders at the manufacture level. 
Conventions must be adopted by the community offices to produce harder permits to make it 
more difficult for the fraudsters to modify or predict. 
Additionally, 21.2% showed the threats associated with photo replacement. Photo 
replacement is eliminating the data picture from the original individuals’ permit and 
modifying it with an impostor’s information. Similarly, eighteen-point-two percent (18.2%) 
presented an impostor’s alteration of the identity. The impersonator can amend the biometric 
traits to adjust the information in a real permit to acquire more confirmation.   
Furthermore, the outbreaks to the biometric data template in the storage database are 
explained. Forty-five-point-five percent (45.5%) of the participants exposed brute-force 
attack as the risky weakness. While 33.3% presented PIN retrieving, because a masquerader 
can blow out PIN from the kept application to obtain unlawful records. Also, 15.2% 
presented eavesdropping. An attacker can secretly spy the communication path and intersects 
the communication by means of digital devices like the Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) tag. The 6.1% showed Denial-of-service (DoS). Because an invader can try to stop 
the original operators from retrieving the database application. Hence, 3rd factor 
authentication is needed to receive PIN secret to avert invaders from compromising specific 
score. The results of the study are obtainable in Fig. 9a and 9b. 
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Figure 9: (a) The threats of the biometric technology (b) The attack of the biometric   
technology 
Several cases of persons data connected to physical and behavioral characteristics of end-
user’s acceptance is explained. Fingerprints and facial images received the maximum 
favorable attention from the participants with forty-four percent (44%) and 32% receptively. 
This is because fingerprints are used in various national ID systems, institutions and they are 
more stable. For example, household access control, employees’ identification, entrance pass 
attendance and client recognition. They are simple because the person merely requires to 
press the sensor interface of the verification device for fingerprint extraction.  
Face image is the most acceptable modalities, because people pick out and verify their 
household, friends and comrades by observing at the expression. Also, 10% of the 
respondents chosen iris verification, because it is more reliable and secure although tough to 
operate. The sensory system has been established in various sectors and no record has shown 
its data breach. The 6% took the signature scan, because they are hard to forge than the 
regular handwriting. While 4% chose voice scan, 4% chosen Hand scan. The outcomes of the 
analysis are shown in Fig. 10. 
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Figure 10: The biometric modalities 
The modality limitations associated with acceptance and rejection of the biometric 
application are explained. For example, the FAR, FRR, Crossover error rate, Received 
detection traits and the sensor screen. The FRR is the rate of likelihood that the biometric 
application can incorrectly fail to obtain legal person characteristics. The probability that the 
biometric application fails to recognize a legitimate user. The formula is given as  
; FRR indicated Failed Reject Rate, NFR is the Non-Failed Rate, the 
NEVA is the Number of Enrollees Verified Attempt and NIA is the Number of Identified 
Attempts. However, FAR is the likelihood that the biometric application can incorrectly 
approve an illegitimate operator. Or possibility that a biometric application can mistakenly 
identify a personality. The formula is . The FAR is Failed Accept Rate, 
NFA is Number of Failed Accept, NIIA is Number of Impersonator Identified Attempts and 
NIVA is Number of Impostors Verified Attempt. The results of the investigation are 
presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4: The biometric characteristics  
Biometric 
characters 




Speed FAR (%) FRR (%) 
Face image Medium High High Medium 1% 20% 
Iris High Medium Medium Medium 2% 2% 
Fingerprint High High High High 0.94% 0.99% 
Voice Medium High Medium High 2% 10% 
Signature Medium Medium Medium High - - 
Hand scan Medium High Medium High 2% 2% 
4.7 Protective measures of the biometric data 
Notwithstanding the rise in the outbreaks and intimidations to biometric application, greatest 
measure to protect and improve the secrecy of the participants data are explained. Sixty 
percent (60%) and 51.5% of the participants recommended the encryption method and 
program to secure and protect the biometric data in the database. This is because the 
encryption protects a classified and sensitive private biometric data and securely stores it in 
the database.  
The 30% of the respondents suggested building data hubs. Because the data hub can offer 
national resources such as information protection, storage and backup-retrieval. While 58.3% 
and thirty-three-point-three percent (33.3%) declared identity management, because it helps 
to scrutinize the organization information, control, manage and guaranteed access to the 
specific application of the information. The 10% of the respondents suggested the decreased 
accessibility, because safety is a very vital event in the storage of the administration 
information. Therefore, the policymakers must consider legalized people in various sectors 
like public society, industrialization, security experts and government officers. The results of 






Figure 11: (a) The protection mechanism of the biometric technology, (b) The privacy 
enhancement of the biometric technology  
4.8 The existing biometric passport system 
The existing system of the biometric application is based on the information filling and 
recommendation from the various stake officers. The user either download the form or picks 
the form from the regional centers to fill. Upon filling, the user attaches the necessary 
requirement, including payment slip, create a manilla file to save the documents and take 
them personally to the migration office center within that region. The officer receives the file 
for verification. If the user does not meet the requirement, the user’s file is returned, else the 
officer verifies the file and delivered them to the headquarter for passport processing. Figure 







Figure 12: The existing framework of the biometric passport system 
4.9 The proposed system of the biometric application 
The proposed system of the biometric application involved five (5) levels. Level 1 input login 
details to choose the region office. Level 2 and 3 automatic generation of the region code 
number and form filling. The code number is an exceptional unique number. For example, 
(AR30081920) code numbers are for the Arua area while (MB66200011920) for Mbale 
province. This code number defined the region where the user is applying. It defined the area 
code, month, year and unique applicant number. This helps to trace the route of the applicant 
and guaranteed the security of the individual information. Level 4 document attachment, like 
photograph, recommendation letter, coy of NIC and payment slip. Once the passport photo is 
uploaded, the system automatically encrypts it for security purpose and then decodes it upon 
the officer’s verification. 
This facilitate in preventing information linkage and fraudsters from invading on personal 
data. Level 5 statement declaration and submission. This creates a personnel data access, 
print a copy before submission to the regional office. Once the officer verified and approved 
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the application form, the system forwards the details to the headquarter for further 
processing. Auto-generated SMS message is sent to the user for verification.  
The in-charge of headquarter views the candidate’s particulars. Once an approval of 
applicants is performed, the SMS confirmation message for biometric scan is automatically 
sent to the applicant for the invitation. Figure 13a and 13b illustrated the Twilio SMS send to 
applicant for verification and biometric scan process. 
(a)                                                                                                                          (b) 
Figure 13: (a) Twilio verification message (b) Twilio message for the biometric scan 
The biometric traits like the fingerprint, facial image with person’s biodata are supplied as an 
input. The system administrator extracts the fingerprint features (i.e., minutiae points) using 
the USB suprema BioMini authentication scanner of inbuilt software and the facial image 
with high definition Logitech pro webcam 1080. The individual presses the fingerprint in the 
suprema BioMini scanner to interact with the sensing device. The BioStar 2 server is used as 
an application interface for the biometric feature extraction. BioStar 2 uses several ports to 
establish device and data communication. The encryption algorithm processes the biometric 
information to get the encrypted secured data template, then the data is kept in the database.  
The python flash is used for the development.  
Many states are considering biometric technology application submission package with 
mixture of manual and the automated arrangement to keep biometric data secure. The 
application alerts any intruder who tries to access person’s data. With these security 
protection mechanisms, researcher is able to tackle users’ fears of the individual privacy-
protection of the biometric data. Of the worry tackled, access is granted only to those 
individuals who applied for the application. The persons information is protected and 
encoded with Twilio SMS message that ensured person's information safety. Each individual 
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has privileges to access and view the status of the application. Any illegal attempt with 
individual data, text SMS is automatically sent to the users for the warning, detection and 
alerting. 
The organization is able to manipulate the individual data and provided timely feedback. 
Therefore, increased correctness and competence. Figure 14 illustrated the suggested 
architecture of the biometric application system. 
 
Figure 14: The proposed architecture of the biometric application system 
4.10 Security tools used to protect the biometric data template 
To enhance the challenges of the stolen biometric data template in the database, data misuse 
and template modification, different security tools and approach are installed. These tools 
focused in protecting the biometric data template in the storage database based on the 
biometric traits such as the fingerprint, facial image with individual’s biodata. The security 
applications installed are Jinja2, Wtforms, SQLAlchemy, Cryptography, Twilio SMS and the 





The Jinja2 is utilized for example, as a template engine. It comprised of the variables and 
labels to direct the decision. It is a designer-friendly templating language for python, used to 
secure the optional sandboxed template execution environment. Jinja2 provided a secured 
outline for mechanization of experiment, trial submission and aids to avoid Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) occurrence through its powerful automatic Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML) escaping system. The XSS enabled the invaders to insert customer writings to an 
internet submission seen from diverse clients. The XSS permits invaders to insert customer-
side scripts into homepage observed by other users. The cross-site scripting vulnerability can 
be used by invaders to bypass access controls.  
The primary function of a template engine is to sort out the logic from the horizon. Thus, the 
template engines considered obeys the following principles: 
(i)  Restricted set of command structures such as Loop i.e., for loop or while loop, 
condition i.e., if, elif and else, filter3 i.e., variable filter, setting of variables and 
printing of a variable. 
(ii)  Mechanism to include other templates, to use inheritance of templates or to use 
macros, written entirely in the restricted instructions from above. 
(iii)  No way to write pure code in the language that is used for the backing (i.e., PHP, 
Python or Java) within the template. 
4.10.2 Wtforms 
The Wtforms generates applicant’s passport forms, rather than coding HTML. It secures the 
application far from Cross-Site-Reference-Forgery (CSRF) unit. The CSRF operation is 
rotated around the extraordinary token. Note that CSRF is a character of malicious 
exploitation of a website where unauthorized commands are transported from a user that the 
web application trusts. Through the Wtforms, the cross-site request forgery attack is 
prevented.  
Notice that, when carrying out the web page form using Wtforms and python, the contours 
are represented as class representatives. This allowed clearer backend validations before data 
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proceeds to the database, meaning in case the front-end is tempered with, the Wtforms 
validations can be capable to manage the authentication. 
4.10.3 SQLAlchemy  
The SQLAlchemy is used to create the database models. It’s one of the most popular and 
time-tested language for securing the database. It generates storage unit as a replacement for 
software drivers straightaway. The security gain is to prevent the Structured Query Language 
(SQL) insertion occurrence, zero-day attack for various databases plus other database 
exploited through the application. The researcher doesn’t code SQL declarations, because a 
substitute makes the object representative, then SQLAlchemy think out the best and free 
outbreak SQL declaration correspondence. The SQL expressions can be applied 
independently of the Object Relational Mapper (ORM). When using the ORM, the SQL 
expression language remains part of the public face Application Program Interface (API) as it 
is used within object relational configurations and queries. Notice that SQL injection is the 
location of malicious code in SQL statements via the web page input (Bayer, 2016). Figure 
15 presented a model of SQLAlchemy dependency layers. The SQLAlchemy helped in 


















4.10.4 The cryptography 
In cryptography, the plain text is encoded into cipher text with the help of encryption 
algorithm, the coded text is decoded to plain text with the help of decryption algorithm. In 
both operations, the cryptographic key played a significant part. It limits the access of the 
coded data so that the possessor of the key can decrypt cipher text properly. It prevents data 
from being read by any third party because the system uses a secret key to encrypt and 
decrypt data which is shared between the sender and receiver. In this technique, it is expected 
that only the sincere user knows the decryption key. Therefore, cryptography, as a powerful 
tool in biometric technology, needed an efficient key management technique. The key 
management technique included the process of key generation, key modification and key 
sharing (Stallings, 2017). 
The cryptography encrypts the fingerprint, facial image using a Fernet keys. The keys are 
categorized into two smaller keys 128 bits Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key and a 
256 bits Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) with Hash-Based Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) signing key. These keys are retained in a central source that keystone passes in a 
library to handle the encryption-decryption process. The Fernet keys guaranteed that, the 
communication encoded cannot be read missing the secret key.  
The multiFernet key is generated from the combination of the two Fernet keys to perform the 
encoded writing using 1st key in the records. Then decodes it one at a time. The key 
interchange replaced the old key to add a new key Infront. The PIN alternation is accessible 
by the private key avert damage and decreases the worry of outbreak. Token turning as 
offered by multiFernet, is the best exercise and the means of cryptographic hygiene, designed 
to fix damage in case of undetected event and to increase the difficulty of attacks.  
4.10.5 The Twilio SMS programmable  
The Twilio SMS message is utilized to send users and operators a text message about 
unlawful entry, in case the officer in-charge is not the one accessing the record. Twilio is a 
cloud communication system that offers SMS services to its users. It fetches the logs for any 
outbound messages from the narrative, like the sent folder in the email client. Utilize this data 
to update the Customer Relationship Management (CRM) whenever a client gets a text 
message from the application. Or to see the recipients of an SMS message before it sends to 
ensure they don't receive it before. The Twilio message brings in any inbound messages to 
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any of the Twilio numbers. This is like the email inbox. If you apply a single Twilio number 
to commit many types of messages, it can route the responses to the necessary people, 
founded along the sentiment score of the consistency of the message, who mailed it. Or what 
time it arrived in. It also sent lots of SMS messages while parabola flow runs. This permits 
one to send out custom or generic SMS messages to a list of recipients at scheduled times. 
Use the destination to send the weekly performance, remind occurrence of an event and 
threats coming up in the system, or constantly ping the user details to remind one of any 
approval privileges to allow access to the certification. 
4.10.6 The suggested MVT-HUF architecture   
The suggested operation is called MVT- Helper Utility Filesystem (HUF), an alteration of the 
Model View Controller (MVC) to secure the biometric data template in the database 
utilization. The model is a class that manages data rationally. The view indicates the 
visualization of the datum a model holds. It is employed to execute the business logic and 
interact with a model to hold data and renders a template. The template contains the data 
transmission to the model object and keeps view and model differently.  
Figure 16a and 16b showed the suggested architecture of the MVT-HUF and the functional 
intent of the ePassport. The MVT is slightly altered to provide safety measure. For instance, 
the Wtforms is presented for CSRF security. The helper, presented to hold big processes 
amongst model and view. The biometric passport is utilized as class represented as a model 
combining fingerprint and facial image at the character stage with individual’s biodata to 
arise the template files. This template files are steadily kept in the storage incorporated with 
Twilio SMS. The encryption-decryption algorithm based cryptographic key management is 
used to ensure the protection of the database template.  
The algorithm accounted for the satisfactory inequalities in the biometric involvement. Any 
impersonator whose trial biometric is different from the enrolled biometric features, cannot 
break private key. The biometric features encrypted stored an encoded value of the PIN as a 
template byte and text file.  The hashed key can be operated as a cryptographic key, an 
invader cannot acquire the unique key exterior the encoding scheme. 
In Fig. 16b, it’s realized that, the encrypted fingerprint and face image is kept in the file 
system (including the ciphertext of second key). Meanwhile, user biodata is stored in 
relational tables. It is a significant to recognize that the computer memory in a file system is 
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implemented using random integers identifications (IDs) that holds less meaning to the user 
at presentation layers as the presentation level IDs are computed from helpers other than 
coming from the database. 
 
Figure 16: (a) The framework model of the MVT-HUF system, (b) The function design of the 
ePassport 
4.11 The proposed encryption-decryption algorithm and database model  
4.11.1 The encryption algorithm  
In encryption process, the user input the credentials. The username and password are 
compared with a copy kept in the database. If the details do not match, the user is requested 
to re-enter either a new username or password, else if it matches an authentication code is 
produced and sent to the user via SMS. Upon the user receiving the authentication code, the 
user is requested to input the received authentication code. The authentication code is 
matched with a copy that is kept in the database. If the authentication code does not match 
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with the copy stored in the database, the user is guided back to login interface. If it matches, 
the database generates two Fernet keys (K1 and K2).  
The Fernet keys are secret key of symmetric implementation based on cryptography that 
supports key rotation in the form of byte key. The two keys are combined to further generate 
multiFernet key (K) for encryption. The K is integrated with biometric features (fingerprint, 
facial) and biodata passing through the encryption algorithm to produce the biometric data 
template as byte file and a text file. The two files are incorporated with Twilio SMS message 
and securely kept in the database as template file. Figure 17 summarized the proposed 
implementation of the encryption algorithm framework. 
 




4.11.2 The decryption algorithm  
In decryption process, administrator is required to input the login details. The username and 
password are compared with a copy that is kept in the database. If the details do not tally, the 
administrator is requested to re-enter either a new username or password, else if it matches an 
authentication code is created and sent to the administrator via SMS. Upon receiving the 
authentication code, the administrator is required to enter the received authentication code. 
The authentication code that the administrator entered is correlated with a copy that is kept in 
the database. If the authentication code does not match with the copy stored in the database, 
the administrator is led back to login interface. If it matches, the database generates the 
encrypted byte and text files in form of K10. Then administrator enters the two Fernet keys 
(K1 and K2). The two keys are combined to further generate the multiFernet key (K) for 
decryption. The K is integrated with biometric data template (byte file and text file) passing 
through the decryption algorithm to produce the plain text. Figure 18 summarized the 
proposed implementation of the decryption algorithm framework. 
 
Figure 18: The proposed framework of the decryption algorithm 
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In the case an attacker attempts to access the biometric data template in the database, the 
database system will block the attacker from unauthorized access. Because the system cross-
verify the attacker based on two different kind of identifications such as the knowledge base 
(something the user knows) and the possession factor (something the user owns) such as 
authentication code. This is really important in securing the biometric template information in 
the database. Even if the perpetrators are able to discover a user’s password, they will require 
the authentication code as second kind of identification needed to login into the application. 
Figure 19 presented the suggested security measures implemented via the encryption process. 
 




4.11.3 Database models 
The SQLite3 is used as the proposed model for the development process, and the database 
switched to PostgreSQL, because of the ORM (SQLAlchemy) for security purpose. It handles 
a range of workloads, from single machines to data warehouses or Web services with many 
concurrent users. The PostgreSQL has multi-value fields (a.k.a arrays and nested tables) 
which can reduce the need for joins. Dramatically increase in the performance of storing and 
retrieving the multi-dimensional data structures and making it possible to write stored 
procedures in other programming languages such as C, Perl, Python and JavaScript V8 
engine (Bayer, 2016).  Figure 20 summarized the database classes of the SQLite3. 
 
Figure 20: The SQLite3 database classes 
4.12 The implementation and evaluation process 
The integration of python flask, the sublime as the code editor, Twilio for SMS notification, 
DB browser SQLite for the database, Biostar 2 server for BioMini suprema and high 
definition Logitech webcam for biometric feature extraction, win virtual environment and 
Ubuntu as the testing server with cryptography module are used for the implementation and 
evaluation process.  
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4.12.1 The cryptographic of Fernet keys   
The cryptographic Fernet keys are built on three criteria. The AES within the Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) mode with a 128-bit keys for encryption using the PKCS7 padding (Fig. 21). 
The HMAC to secure hashed authentication of two-hundred-fifty-six bits of keys (SHA256). 
The Initialization Vector (IV) to create a random private code utilizing os.urandom() 
(Contributors, 2019). AES provides benefits like top-level security and operations doesn’t 
reveal invalid binary.  
The AES uses the limits like private key (0,1) either in 128-bits,192-bits or 256-bits lengthy. 
While CBC uses the padding for block codes. The constraints rest on the IV and private key. 
The IV is an exceptional public data, arbitrarily changeable at the encoded time to avert data 
recurrence, ensuring that it’s hard for a hacker to get bytes to crack into the template storage. 
It guaranteed that, data is not trickled by the coded text and disallowed indistinguishable 
plaintexts from fabricating matching encoded text.  
The HMAC is utilized to compute the statement, authentication using cryptographic coded 
roles, paired off by a private key. This hashed procedure arbitrarily generated the bytes 
equivalent in duration to the summary size of the private hashed role stored. Figure 21 








Figure 21: The AES Block (Stallings, 2017) 
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4.12.2 The key management for the encryption algorithm  
The encryption algorithm uses the combination of two Fernet keys, i.e., the initial key (K1) 
and the second key (K2). User inputs original biometric feature Image (I) and K2 to generate 
K1-encoded (byte key). The K1-encoded is further applied to generate K1 decoded (string key) 
using K2. The K1 encoded is combined with second key to produce multiFernet key (K). The 
K is utilized in encrypting image I to realize the encoded image file (I0). In order to guarantee 
the safekeeping of the biometric data in the database, the encrypted image (I0) is further re-
encrypted with multiFernet key (K) to produce an encrypted byte and a text file (K10). The 
two files are incorporated with Twilio sms and securely kept in the database as a template 
file.  
The encryption is the operation of transforming information (plaintext) into something that 
appears to be random and meaningless (ciphertext) so that it is unclear to anyone but to the 
intended receiver. Figure 22 summarized the stepwise process for the key management of the 
encryption algorithm. Presented is the key management using encryption algorithm.  
 




4.12.3 The multiFernet encryption algorithm 
The multiFernet is generated from fernet suite that consists of various block ciphers as 
illustrated in Fig. 23. 
 
Figure 23: The multiFernet key implementation 
4.12.4 The key management for the decryption algorithm 
To obtain the unique image (I) from the encoded byte and text file (K10), the decryption 
procedure is reversed engineering of the encoded step. The K10 is decrypted using the 
multiFernet key (K) to realize the encrypted Image I0. The K is generated from the 
combination of K1 and K2.  The K is further employed to decrypt the encrypted image I0 to 
yield the original image I. When formatted token is positively decoded, the unique plain text 
image (I) is acknowledged as the result, else exception error is produced.  
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The decryption operates by changing encrypted information (secret code text) back to 
readable plaintext so that it is understandable again. Figure 24 summarized the stepwise 
process for the key management of the decryption algorithm. Given below is the stepwise 
procedures for the key management. 
 
Figure 24: The key management of the decryption algorithm 
4.12.5 The performance evaluation of the algorithm 
The performance evaluation of the algorithm is based on how accurate a biometric system is, 
i.e., measure of its performance by applying a varying score threshold to the similarity scores 
(Biometrics, 2014). The results can either be presented as a pair, i.e., FRR at a certain level of 
FAR, or in plots (Fig. 2). The rates can be expressed in many ways, for instance, in percent 
(1%), decimal format (0.010) or by using powers of ten (102).  
Some systems don't inform a similarity score, only the match/nonmatch decision. In that case 
it is only possible to gain a single FRR/FAR pair (and not a continuous series) as result of a 
performance evaluation. If the mode of operation (the security level) is adjustable (i.e., it can 
have a means of controlling the internally used score threshold), else the performance 
evaluation can be run again and again in different modes to obtain further FRR/FAR pairs.  
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There are basically three categories of performance evaluations i.e., technology, scenario and 
operational evaluation. In technology evaluation, the evaluation uses the saved data, for 
instance, previously acquired fingerprint images. In scenario evaluation, the evaluation uses 
end-to-end system prototype or simulated environment. In operational evaluation, the 
evaluation uses the performance of a complete biometric system to determine the specific 
application environment with a specific population. 
The technology evaluations are by far the most common and often feasible. Because the 
evaluation is done using saved samples, and the outcomes are reproducible and it is less time 
consuming. The greatest disadvantage is that they do not necessarily reflect the conditions 
where the system will eventually be used. Because of this, it can be beneficial to collect a 
dedicated set of samples trying to mimic the conditions of the target system when preparing 
for an evaluation. 
Going back to the prototype of the developed system, the performance evaluation of the 
algorithm was based on the inputs from the users. Three factors were considered for the 
evaluation process:  
(i)  Performance, is the system accurate to achieve the intended purpose. 
(ii)  Acceptability, are users willing to accept the system in their daily lives. 
(iii)  Convenience, is the system easy to use by users and difficult to hack by an attacker.  
A total sample of 150 respondents from three universities were registered in the prototype 
system. Sixty-six percent (66%) of the respondents expressed positive willingness in using 
the system. The 40% cited ease to use, 28.67% specified security privileges and 31.33% 
expressed convenience. These henceforth, informed the investigator that the stored biometric 
data template provided the level of security needed on the user’s biometric data template in 
the database. 
4.13 Discussion of the results 
This study is conducted with the purpose of identifying and analyzing users’ fears of 
biometric technology and to build up an efficient algorithm for securing the biometric data 
template in the database. To accomplish this purpose, the study tried to achieve this aim by 
fulfilling the four specific objectives shown in section 1.4.2. It is essential to determine the 
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vulnerabilities and attacks against biometric technology from the existing literature and 
finding ways to protect and secure the biometric data template in the database. 
The study, therefore, attempts to resolve the subsequent research questions such as: How 
secure is biometric technology used in the biometric passport acquisition? How people’s 
biometric data are being held within the passport attainment? What potential privacy-security 
dangers and users' fears are related to biometric technologies? What countermeasure do users 
recommend to protect the biometric data template in the database? 
4.13.1 How secure is biometric technology used in the biometric passport acquisition?  
A substantial effect to investigate the safety of biometric technology is identified based on the 
wider knowledge of the biometric passport acquisition by the respondents. The answers 
indicated that 69.3% agreed that the biometric technology is more dependable than the 
tradition-based protection method. Because it plays a big part in controlling security of 
information within an organization. While 30.7% disagreed, quoting that the biometric 
technology can be violated and abused by an impostor. Thus, a requirement for person’s 
mindfulness about the safety and privacy of the data distribution in the everyday various 
registration events (Fig. 6).  
4.13.2 How people’s biometric data are being handled during the passport issuance? 
This question proved to investigate the fundamental factors of users feeling towards the 
biometric information handling. It focused the analysis to identify if the participants studied, 
had worries of the technology (Fig. 8). Thirty-eight-point-three percent (38.8%) and 24.2% of 
the respondents dreaded exposure of individual data. This is because the biometric data can 
be utilized for other things than the original planned aim. Forty-eight-point-five percent 
(48.5%) and thirty-point-five percent (30.5%) are afraid of improper data transfer, because 
the document of the person can be exposed to fraud. Because the records may be tracked, the 
files may be given in response to a data security requirement. Hence, the information transfer 
requires careful monitoring and a tracking device. Additionally, 22.9% and nine-point-one 
percent (9.1%) presented misuse of information. Because the DNA information can expose a 
person’s health disease.  
So, mindfulness and user’s fears need to be addressed, because the fear of the adoption of the 
biometric technology still remain a question to answer. This study, therefore, can aid the 
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technology creators to realize the important insight of the user's worries on the acceptance of 
the biometric application and helps draw a better conclusion.  
4.13.3 What is the potential privacy-security risks and users' fears regarding the 
biometric technologies? 
This question tried to explain the fundamental threats experienced in the issuing of the 
biometric passport in relation to users’ fears. The probe of the factors prompting participants 
fear in using the biometric technology as well as the safekeeping with the suggested solutions 
for the implementation of the biometric application. The results obtained in the 
aforementioned (Fig. 8) showed that the common worries are related to exposer of personal 
data, the abuse of personal information and unauthorized access. It can be concluded that, 
forged travel document is the highest encountered security risk. Because the identity scam of 
travel documents is the broad range of crimes and terrorism committed globally Fig. 9a and 
9b. The same conclusion can be drawn that individual data collected need to be collected for 
legitimate purpose. Accordingly, guidelines need to be adhered by the public citizens to 
ensure that the passport documents are standard and harder for the impostors to forge and 
predict and easy for the authority to trace where, when, how and by whom the identity fraud.  
In light of the above threats related to biometric technology, users fear that some wrongdoers 
around the workplaces and illegal contractors of the association can possibly abuse the 
personal information for another intended purpose. The suggested is an appropriate policy 
maker to craft policies that warns in contrast to data linkages of individual information. 
Because information is resided wherever in the online and can be stolen by fraudsters in the 
present information systems.  
4.13.4 What countermeasure do users recommend to protect the biometric data 
template in the database? 
This question proved to serve the third objective that required getting an algorithm to enhance 
the privacy and safety template of the biometric application. Users expressed encryption 
technique as the greatest measures to protect and improve the privacy of the user’s data Fig. 
11a and 11b. The encryption technique helps protect the biometric sensitive private data and 
enhance the security of the database communication. The encryption algorithm is based on 
the cryptographic module of Fernet keys instance, where two Fernet keys are combined to 
generate a multiFernet key (K) for the encryption. The two (2) unreadable encrypted byte file 
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and text file is created. These files are incorporated with Twilio message and securely stored 
in the database server. Thus, prevented data being compromised by an impostor. Living by 
the framework in (Fig. 17), the same conclusion can be drawn near the model. It can be well-
known that no biometric application is ideal. The determination as to which biometric is to be 
used can be prepared by the foundation of the operation and the kind of application as well as 
the degree of protection required.  
The Twilio SMS is implemented for the validation over unlawful access to application 
template. For an attacker attempting to access data template in the database, the system 
blocks the attacker from unauthorized access. Because the system can cross-verify the 
attacker based on something it owns such as authentication code. The Twilio SMS message 
fetch the login for any outbound messages from the application as well as any inbound 
messages to any of the Twilio numbers.  
The Linux 18.040 is utilized as a customer storage to offer an interaction and allowed 
individual call for resources. The users and the server each have separate jobs to accomplish. 
Figure 25 summarized the customer-storage structure. 
 
 
Figure 25: The client-server architecture 
The results are verified with user’s biometric traits, containing fifty (50) fingerprints and fifty 
(50) facial image templates incorporated with the personal biodata. The 256 X 256 resolution 
is used. The facial image is uniformly illuminated and taken from the right mind with no 
tilting and with a plain background color. The end product of the image is set to 600dpi with 
120 pixels as the standard, recommended by ISO/IEC (Griffin & Ph, 2005; Tistarelli & 
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Nixon, 2009). The BioStar 2 server was used as the platform interface for the biometric 
feature extraction. The encrypted byte and text files are incorporated with Twilio 
programmable SMS. The Twilio SMS message is auto-generated directly from the database 
to alert users in circumstance an attacker attempted to access the database. The text message 
is one of the security mechanisms successfully implemented. It helped inform the users and 
the officer the protected data template in the storage database and how individuals are 
indirectly involved in awarding or refusing access to the exercise of the biometric template 
information.  
The analysis outcomes of the study are explained based on the users concerns and knowledge 
of biometric passport technology. The proposed framework of the encryption-decryption 
algorithm on the cryptographic component using multiFernet key instance are explained in 
details. User data template in the database is securely protected. The findings of the proposed 
approach outweigh the previous studies in a way that, the proposed approach provided high 
level of security that guard against impostor’s attack, because access to user’s biometric data 
in the database is controlled and monitored. The privacy and security risks of the biometric 
data as well as unauthorized access to database server is secured. Because the database server 
can block the attacker from unauthorized access, cross-verify the attacker based on the 
possesses, such as authentication code and finally sent Twilio SMS message to user for 
confirmation. This study therefore, surpass the previous studies that looked at the 
identification of attacks at the biometric template database, security and accuracy mechanism 
to biometric template protection based on transformation as well as privacy weakness of the 






CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Conclusion  
The aim of the study is to develop an algorithm to improve the secrecy and security template 
of biometric technology. As biometric technology applied to many applications, the study 
focused within the biometric passport.  The survey received two major objective functions, 
the analysis factors to user’s concerns and knowledge as well as the algorithm to improve the 
secrecy and security template of the biometric technology. The objectives are to identify 
users' concerns and fears relating to the biometric passport technology and to develop an 
effective algorithm to secure the biometric data template in the database. 
The methodology deployed are based on survey study and encryption-decryption algorithm 
method. Three-hundred-and-eighty-four (n=384) participants are documented holders, while 
thirty-three (n=33) respondents are issuance officers. The analysis results indicated that users 
have secrecy and security fears like an exposer of individual information, inappropriate data 
transfer, misuse of individual information as well as forging document and brute-force attack.  
The encryption-decryption algorithm method is developed to encode the biometric data in the 
database.  The encoded data produced two encrypted template files (byte and text files). The 
two enciphered byte and text files are incorporated with Twilio message and securely kept in 
the database server.  The storage has security measures that guarded in contrast to impostors’ 
outbreak together with persons data. Any potential compromise of the user’s data within the 
center area or regional offices is recognized. The access to the database system is controlled 
and monitored. The biometric data offered high level of security to the users’ data privacy 
and integrity. In circumstances where an attacker attempts to access the biometric data 
template in the database, the system blocks the attacker from unauthorized access and cross-
verify the attacker based on the validation of its ownership i.e., authentication code. Even if 
the perpetrators are able to discover a user’s password, they will lack the second kind of 
identification required to log into the application. 
This study, therefore, contributed to the awareness of the users’ fears of privacy and security 
issues, especially on biometric passport acquisition. Because non-technological topics like 
factors promoting the adoption of the technology and individuals expected worries are 
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explained in details. Second, the development of the secured algorithm for protecting the 
biometric data template in the database based on the multiFernet key generated from the 
Fernet keys instance. The multiFernet key limits the damage in the event of an undetected 
event and to increase the difficulty of brute-force attacks. For instance, if a worker who had 
access to the organization Fernet key leaves, you can generate new Fernet key, rotate all of 
the tokens currently deployed using that new key, and then retire the old Fernet key(s) to 
which the employee had access. Third, the implementation of Twilio SMS message in 
alerting the users and the officers in the case any attacker tries to hack the database server.  
Fourth the scientific publication to the body of knowledge as well as the prototype of 
ePassport system that enable users to apply online. 
Lastly, the study can inspire practitioners of the technology to carefully weigh the likely 
benefits and thoroughly assess the hazards connected with the implementation of this 
technology in a broader logic before engaging themselves in full production. In conclusion, 
the biometric technology should be developed from the foundation of the operation of the 
application and the degree of protection required.  
5.2 Recommendations 
The following are the recommendations portrayed from the research results presented: 
(i)  The policymaker to design security policies to protect against the vulnerabilities of 
users’ biometric information. Because individual’s data exist in everyplace online 
and security concerns are particularly salient on the use of the biometric data. 
 
(ii)   A prerequisite to facilitate the database server with additional safety coding like hash 
functions and two factor authentications to prohibit data requests transmission. 
Setting out principles and alertness session to all mediators at the start of the 
engagement before being granted access to personal information. 
 
(iii)  The industrial creator to propose a passport permit that is really hard to create. 
Centralize database centre appropriately to safeguards the data template and allows 
the public adoption of the biometric application with self-enrollment.  
 
(iv)  Audit all the system verification and identification activities needed at the database 
level to determine all successful and failed attempts for analysis and scrutiny by 
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biometric system designers. This will significantly detect anomalies and identify 
threats of present biometric technology. 
 
(v)  The databases of biometric systems where biometric data templates are stored should 
have the access points controlled by using biometrics in preference to use of 
traditional authentication modes like passwords so that only authorized and trusted 
users e.g., biometric system designer are able to manage these databases and this will 
in addition, prevent hacking of database passwords.   
Other results achieved in this thesis, raised further interesting and challenging questions. 
Thus, a need for upcoming research pertinent to employ satisfactions of user’s willingness 
and adoption of the biometric technology without compromising their privacy and security. 
The submissions for upcoming study are: 
(i)  Further study, utilizing the multi-biometric and multi-factor authentication systems, 
focusing upon the iris and the retina for high security application and performance. 
 
(ii)  Research on ways to derive encryption keys from either fingerprint, face or iris that 
do not change with repeated scans and makes it difficult for the brute-force attack.   
 
(iii)  Future work to develop a mobile application for the biometric technology 
(ePassport). Capable of helping the immigration authorities to discover fraud and 
extract records from stored fraudster. The mobile application should automatically 
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Appendix 1: Qualitative questionnaire for passport issuance officers 
 
Implemented by  
 
Nelson Mandela African Institution of Science and Technology (NM-AIST) 
School of Computational and Communication Science and Engineering 
 
Consent Statement  
  
I am a staff of Muni University currently student at NM-AIST who is carrying on a 
Ph. D research study to investigate the privacy and security of the biometric 
technology based on data from international passports in Uganda. Wish to request for 
a little of your time, for basic questions around the knowledge of the passport 
acquisition in Uganda.  The answers you offer will be kept secret. The information 
you provide will improve the government understanding of how the seclusion and 









Section A: Demographic and Passport Acquisition 
Instruction: Please tick (√) the option best describing your status from the values on the 
right-hand side (for A1). 
Question One 
Parameters Values 
A1: Gender  
Male                 Female 
 
Section B: Passport Issuance Process  
Instruction: Please circle/state response that best identifies your case from the question 
below (from B1- B8). 
Question Two 
 
B1: Is access to security of Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) production and 
issuance facilities controlled? 
 




B2: Which security features of passport are important as stated by the International Civil 







B3: What threats/attacks do you experience to the security of issuing passports (travel 
documents)? (You can tick (√) more than one response to this inquiry)  
Counterfeiting a travel document 
Photo substitution 
Substitution of entire page(s) or visas 
Impostors alter identity  
Other specify 
 
B4: What efforts are required to mitigate the impacts of identity theft? (You can circle more 
than one response to this inquiry)  
Improve the integrity  
Improve the chances of identifying extremist  




B5: Is it appropriate for Government to use biometrics to verify identity for passports? 
    Very suitable 
     Neutral 
     Not suitable 
     Other specify 
 
B6: Should biometric IDs be combined with other personal identifiers? 
Yes  
No 
Other specify  
 
B7: Is it suitable for government to create a biometric database for serious offenders? 
Very suitable  
Suitable 
Neutral 
      Not suitable 
 




Other specify  
 
Section C: Security Issuance Process 
Question three 





C2: Which data elements do you consider when uploading information to the database. 
(Circle more than one answer)  
Travel document identification number  
Type of document (passport or other) 
Issuing State’s ICAO Code 
Status of the document (i.e. Stolen blank)  












C4: Who is responsible for the individual’s biometric data in the database? (Circle more than 




All staff members at the issuing offices 
Other specify 
 
C5: How many stages are involved in the issuance process from submission of application to 


















C7: Why do you use the specific biometric data chosen in D11 above? (Circle more than one 
answer)  
Easy to use 
High-security components 
Complex to forge individual data 
Other specify 
 














Some features can be reverse engineered  
Other Specify 
 
C11: How do you detect compromised template data? (Circle more than one answer)  
Sending signal to the authorized officer 
Alarming the authority for intrusion 
Blocking the IP for the access 
Other specify 
 
C12: How do you handle tampered data? (Circle more than one answer)  
Investigate the entree route 
Replace the tempered data 
Extract the reserved copy 
Call the individual for another extracts 
Other specify 
 
C13: Is there segregation of tasks throughout the issuance process, requiring at least two 





C14: What are the commonly expressed fears regarding biometric data and privacy? (Circle 
more than one answer)  
Unauthorized Entree  
Information Disclosure  
Information Abuse 
Improper data transmission  
Other Specify 
 
C15: How are people’s/ Citizen’s information being handled during passport acquisition? 













C16: Do you think current biometrics data solutions can fulfil the requirements of border 
control regarding privacy and security of person’s data? 
Yes  
No  
Need for e-passport control 
Other specify 
 
Section D: Biometric System Database  
Question Five 
 


























D6: What are the normally expressed attacks regarding the biometric passport issuance? 
(Circle more than one answer)  
Brute-force  
Password 










D8:  How are staffs trained in the detection of fraudulent documents? 
Spying  
Using sensor detection 
Other specify 
 























D13: State types of secrecy enhancing technologies legally offered for the citizen acquiring 
the Passport? (Circle more than one answer)  
Anonymous calling cards  
Encryption programmes  
Identity management  
Other specify 
 
Section E: Challenges and Policy 
Question Six 
 




E2: What security features would you suggest for the development and implementation of 







Appendix 2: Quantitative questionnaires for document owners 
  
Implemented by  
 
Nelson Mandela African Institution of Science and Technology (NM-AIST) 
School of Computational and Communication Science and Engineering 
 
Consent Statement  
  
 
I am a staff of Muni University currently student at NM-AIST who is carrying on a 
Ph. D research study to investigate the privacy and security of the biometric 
technology based on data from international passports in Uganda. Wish to request for 
a little of your time, for basic questions around the knowledge of the passport 
acquisition in Uganda.  The answers you offer will be kept secret. The information 
you provide will improve the government understanding of how the seclusion and 













Section A: Demographics  




A1: Gender 1=Male, 2=Female 
A2: Age 1= 21–30, 2=30-60 
A3: Professional 1= Student, 2= Teaching staff 3=Employee, 4= Other 
Specify 
 
Section B: Passport Acquisition  
Instruction: Circle the number best describe your case from the values on the right-hand side 
(B1-B5). 
Question Two 
B1: Do you own a Passport? 1= Yes, 2= No, 3= Other specify 
B2: Type of passport issued? 1=Ordinary, 2=Diplomatic 3= Official, 4= East 
African, 5= Travel Documents, 6= Others  
B3: Form in which passport is 
acquired 
1= Normal, 2=Express, 3= Other specify 
B4: Have you ever travelled 
overseas? 
1=Yes, 2=No 
B5: Purpose for your travel 
Overseas? 
1=Tourist, 2=Business, 3= Health, 4= Education, 5= 
Sports, 6=Employment,7= Conference, 8=Citizenship, 
9= Other 
 
Section C: Technology used in Passport Acquisition  
Instruction: Circle the number best describe your case from the values on the right-hand side 
(C1-C3). 
Question Three 
C1: Have you ever heard about   
Biometrics Technology?   
1= Yes, 2= No 3= Don’t Know 
C2: What type of biometric 
technology do you know? 
1=Fingerprints, 2=Facial, 3=Iris, 4=Palms Image, 
5=Voice, 6=Giant, 7=Other specify  
C3: Do you feel secure in giving 
your biodata to the Internal 
Affairs?  






Section D: Passport Adoption and Usage 
Question Four 
D1-D14: Express your satisfaction in the passport security compliance by showing whether 
you Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neither Agree nor Disagree (U), Disagree (D) and 
Strongly Disagree (SD) by placing a tick (X) in appropriate box where SA=5, A=4, U=3, 













I feel biometric technologies 
are more secure than traditional 
IT security methods. 
     
Security of humanity is 
absolutely dependent on the 
growth and utilization of new 
safety technologies. 
     
Privacy should not be violated 
without reasonable suspicion of 
criminal intent. 
     
Uncomfortable to be under 
surveillance, even though you 
have no criminal intent. 
     
Novel safety technologies are 
likely to be abused by criminals 
     
Storage of data (e.g. 
Fingerprints or DNA samples) 
of all citizens in a central 
database are acceptable step to 
fight crime. 
     
The use of the biometric 
passport (e.g., fingerprint 
verification, facial recognition, 
iris recognition, and voice 
verification) makes me feel 
self-doubting because of the 
risk of my biometric data being 
stolen. 
     
It’s a good chance to replace 
ordinary biometric passports 
with e-passport for security 
purpose. 
     
The biometric-based solutions 
are appropriate solution to 
fraud? 
     
Directors at the institutions 
should store all data they find 
necessary for security reasons 
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as long as they consider it 
necessary. 
Secrecy enhancing 
technologies are a necessity in 
today’s society to preserve 
privacy. 
     
Gathering of personal data 
from unsuspicious individuals 
must be anonymous until 
identification is authorized by 
court order. 
     
Authorized personnel can have 
access to collected personal 
data. 
     
Implementing new security 
technologies must be checked 
for privacy impact. 
     
Usage of biometric passport 
technology. 
     
 
D15: 
Factors Influencing the 














Protect Frauds      
Provide Security      
Identify individual      
Monitor crimes      
Privacy invasion      
 
Section E: Users fear, concerns and challenges 
Instruction: Please circle the number best describing your case from the values (for E1-E). 
Question Five 
E1: What are the commonly expressed fears regarding biometric data and privacy? (Circle 
more than one answer)  
Unauthorized Access 
Information Disclosure  
Information Abuse  




E2: Which biometrics technology would you be comfortable to use in border point? (Circle 
more than one answer)  
Face trait 








E3: In your opinion, what are the main influencing factors for biometric deployment in 
border controls? (Circle more than one answer)  
Protects from crime and frauds 
Provides security 
Identifying and authenticating individuals 
Control access to workplaces  
Ensuring uniqueness of individuals. 
Speed up and verify the identity  
An invasion of privacy? 
Constant monitor and surveillance 
Other Specify 
 
E4: State privacy enhancing technologies should be legally available for all citizens acquiring 
the Passport? (You can circle more than one answer to this question)  
Anonymous calling cards  
Encryption programmes  
Identity management  
Other Specify 
 
E5: Which factor do you think can de-motivated one not to acquire passport? 
Security 
Privacy 







E6: What are the challenges you think exist in acquiring passport? 
High Cost 
Delays in processing 
Bureaucratic, bribe and corruption 
Centralization of processing office 
Insecurity and Duplication of data 
Others Specify  
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E7: What protection mechanisms would you suggest protecting people’s data acquiring 
passport? 
Encryption techniques 
Reduce levels of access to database 
Building data centres 
Others specify  
 
Section F: Policy 
Question Six 




Eliminating tribalism, corruption 
Use district headquarters to issue ePassport 
Other specify  
 
F2: Who should implement new safety technologies? 
The citizens Country  
Local leader 
Government and law marker 
Security experts and intelligence 
Others specify 
 
F3: What your comments regarding regulation of expansion and implementation of new 
safety technologies? 
Laws to protect information about the users 
Sensitization of citizens about new security and safety of information 
Legal procedure for wrong or misuse of information 
keep the personal data as secure as possible 
Others specify 
 







Thank You  
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Appendix 5: Python code for account creation, Login and template rendering 
 
from flask import ( 
    Blueprint, 
    request, 
    session, 
    redirect, 
    url_for, 
    render_template, 
    send_file, 
    send_from_directory 
    ) 
from jinja2 import ( 
    Environment, 
    FileSystemLoader 
    ) 
import os 
env = Environment( 
        loader=FileSystemLoader( 
            'app/blue_prints/home/templates' 
            ) 
        ) 
bp_create_user = Blueprint( 
    'create_user', 
    __name__ 
    ) 
 
#----------------------helper imports---------------------------------- 
from .helpers import ( 
    create_user as bp_helper 
    ) 
#----------------------form imports---------------------------------- 
from .forms import( 
    create_user as forms 
    ) 
#------------------General utility------------------------------------- 
from blue_prints.utils import ( 
    current_user as current_user_utils, 
    request_formatter as request_utils 




    if "e-passport-user-name" in session: 
        if session['e-passport-user-role']=="head-quater": 
            return redirect( 
                url_for( 
                    "head_quater.head_quater_home" 
                    ) 
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                ) 
        elif session['e-passport-user-role']=="applicant": 
            return redirect( 
                url_for( 
                    "applicant.applicant_home" 
                    ) 
                ) 
        elif session['e-passport-user-role']=="regional-office": 
            return redirect( 
                url_for( 
                    "regional_officer_home.regional_officer_home" 
                    ) 
                ) 
    regional_offices=bp_helper.AvailableRegionalOffices() 
    regional_offices=regional_offices() 
    createUserForm=forms.CreateUser() 
    createUserForm.populateOfficeIdChoices( 
        regional_offices=regional_offices 
        ) 
    tmpl = env.get_template( 
                'create_user/__init__.html' 
                ) 
    return tmpl.render( 
                title="Create user", 
                createUserForm=createUserForm 


















Appendix 6: Python code for biometric feature Scanning 
 
from flask import ( 
    Blueprint, 
    request, 
    session, 
    redirect, 
    url_for, 
    render_template, 
    send_file, 
    send_from_directory 
    ) 
from jinja2 import ( 
    Environment, 
    FileSystemLoader 
    ) 
import os 
env = Environment( 
        loader=FileSystemLoader( 
            'app/blue_prints/head_quater/templates' 
            ) 
        ) 
bp_biometric_scan = Blueprint( 
    'biometric_scan', 
    __name__ 
    ) 
 
#----------------------helper imports---------------------------------- 
from .helpers import ( 
    biometric_scan as bp_helper 
    ) 
#----------------------form imports---------------------------------- 
from .forms import( 
    biometric_scan as forms 
    ) 
#------------------General utility------------------------------------- 
from blue_prints.utils import ( 
    current_user as current_user_utils, 
    request_formatter as request_utils, 
    passport as passport_utils 
    ) 
 
class POSTKwargs(object): 
    """docstring for POSTKwargs""" 
 
    def __init__(self, request): 
        super(POSTKwargs, self).__init__() 
 




    def __call__(self): 
 
        kwargs=dict() 
        for a in list(self.request.form): 
            kwargs[a]=self.request.form[a] 
        return kwargs 
 
@bp_biometric_scan.route( 
    "/face_scan_get/<applicant_id>", 
    methods=["POST"] 
    ) 
def face_scan_get(applicant_id): 
    if "e-passport-user-name" in session: 
        if session['e-passport-user-role']=="head-quater": 
            try: 
                
save_changes=current_user_utils.RemoveDecryptedPassportPhotoOfficer( 
                                username=session["e-passport-user-name"] 
                                ) 
                save_changes() 
            except: 
                pass 
            kwargs={ 
                    "document":request.files["webcam"], 
                    "description":"Passport Photo", 
                    "applicant_id":applicant_id 
                    } 
            save_changes=bp_helper.SaveFingerPrint( 
                            **kwargs 
                            ) 
            save_changes() 
            return "Saved" 
            # tmpl = env.get_template( 
            #             'biometric_scan/__init__.html' 
            #             ) 
            # return tmpl.render( 
            #             title="Biometric scan", 
            #             passport_code=passport_code, 
            #             document_state=document_state, 
            #             # applicantDocumentForm=applicantDocumentForm, 
            #             # decryptForm=decryptForm, 
            #             # 
addApplicantDocumentDetail=addApplicantDocumentDetail, 
            #             finger_print_state=finger_print_state 
            #             ) 
        elif session['e-passport-user-role']=="applicant": 
            return redirect( 
                url_for( 
                    "applicant_home.applicant_home" 
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                    ) 
                ) 
        elif session['e-passport-user-role']=="regional-office": 
            return redirect( 
                url_for( 
                    "regional_office_home.regional_office_home" 
                    ) 
                ) 
    return redirect( 
        url_for( 









































Appendix 7: Python code for facial extraction and encryption-decryption process  
<div class="main-content"> 
<section class="mod-text mod-intro content-section"> 
    <div class="wrapper"> 
        <div class="row"> 
            <h3 style="text-align: center; color: maroon"><b>PASSPORT 
APPLICATIONS </b></h3> 
            <hr><br> 
            <div class="col-md-12 col-xs-12"> 
            <a 
href="view_details_head_quater?applicant_id={{applicantDocumentForm.appl
icant_id.data}}" >Go back to view details </a> 
                <!-- CSS --> 




 width: 250px; 
 height: 250px; 





 <!-- Script --> 
 
 <!-- Code to handle taking the snapshot and displaying it locally --> 
 <script language="JavaScript"> 
  
 // Configure a few settings and attach camera 
 function configure(width,height){ 
  Webcam.set({ 
   width: width, 
   height: height, 
   image_format: 'jpeg', 
   jpeg_quality: 90 
  }); 
  Webcam.attach( '#my_camera' ); 
 } 
 // A button for taking snaps 
 
 // preload shutter audio clip 
 var shutter = new Audio(); 
 shutter.autoplay = false; 
 shutter.src = navigator.userAgent.match(/Firefox/) ? 'shutter.ogg' : 
'shutter.mp3'; 
 
 function take_snapshot() { 
  // play sound effect 
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  shutter.play(); 
  // take snapshot and get image data 
  Webcam.snap( function(data_uri) { 
  // display results in page 
  document.getElementById('results').innerHTML = 
   '<img id="imageprev" src="'+data_uri+'"/>'; 
  } ); 
 




 // Get base64 value from <img id='imageprev'> source 
 var base64image = document.getElementById("imageprev").src; 
 var url='face_scan_get/{{applicantDocumentForm.applicant_id.data}}'; 
 console.log(url); 
// var ajax = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
//  ajax.open("POST",url,false); 
//  ajax.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/upload'); 
//  ajax.send(base64image ); 
//  alert('done'); 
 
 Webcam.upload( base64image, url, function(code, text) { 
    console.log(base64image); 
    console.log(code); 
    console.log(text); 
  console.log('Save successfully'); 
  location.reload(); 
  //console.log(text); 





                {% include "biometric_scan/form.html" %} 
            </div> 
        </div> 







 <div class="col-lg-12 col-md-12 col-sm-6 col-xs-6"> 
 {% if decryptForm.password.errors %} 
     {% for error in decryptForm.password.errors %} 
         <span style="color: red; text-align: center;"> 
             {{error}} 
         </span><br> 
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     {% endfor %} 
 {% endif %} 
  
 <form action="biometric_scan_decrypt_upload" method="POST" accept-
charset="utf-8"> 
                    {{ 
                        decryptForm.password( 
                            placeholder="Password", 
                            class="form-control", 
                            style="margin-bottom: 2px;" 
                            ) 
                    }} 
                    {{ 
                        decryptForm.applicant_id 
                    }} 
                    <button type="submit" class="btn">Decrypt</button> 
                </form> 
                <hr> 
 {% if applicantDocumentForm.document.errors %} 
     {% for error in applicantDocumentForm.document.errors %} 
         <span style="color: red; text-align: center;"> 
             {{error}} 
         </span><br> 
     {% endfor %} 
 {% endif %} 
 {% if addApplicantDocumentDetail %} 
     {% if addApplicantDocumentDetail==1 %} 
         <span class="alert alert-success"> 
             Document successfully added! 
         </span><br> 
     {% endif %} 
 {% endif %} 
 </div> 
 <div class="col-lg-6 col-md-6 col-sm-6 col-xs-6"> 
 <h3>Upload new passport photo</h3> 
 <img src="static/images/encrypted/{{document_state[1]['Passport 
Photo']}}.png" width="100" height="100" style="min-height: 100px;" 
class="img-thumbnail img-responsive"> 
 <hr> 
 <form action="face_scan" method="POST" accept-charset="utf-8" 
enctype="multipart/form-data"> 
     {{ 
                applicantDocumentForm.document( 
                    accept="image/*" 
                    ) 
            }} 
            {{ 
                applicantDocumentForm.applicant_id 
            }} 
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            <button type="submit" class="btn btn-primary" style="margin-top: 
2px;"> 
            Upload new passport photo 
            </button> 
 </form> 
 <button type="button" class="btn btn-dark" style="margin-top: 2px;" data-
toggle="collapse" data-target="#webcam-capture"> 
     Webcam 
    </button> 
 </div> 
 <div class="col-lg-6 col-md-6 col-sm-6 col-xs-6"> 
 <h3>Upload finger print scan</h3> 
 {% if finger_print_state==True %} 
        <img src="static/images/encrypted/{{document_state[1]['Finger 
Print']}}.png" width="100" height="100" class="img-thumbnail img-
responsive" style="min-height: 100px;"> 
        {% else%} 
        No finger print uploaded 
        {% endif %} 
 <hr> 
 <form action="finger_print_scan" method="POST" accept-charset="utf-8" 
enctype="multipart/form-data"> 
     {{ 
                applicantDocumentForm.document( 
                    accept="image/*" 
                    ) 
            }} 
            {{ 
                applicantDocumentForm.applicant_id 
            }} 
            <button type="submit" class="btn btn-primary" style="margin-top: 
2px;"> 
            {% if finger_print_state==True %} 
             Upload new finger print scan 
         {% else %} 
             Upload finger print scan 
         {% endif %} 












Appendix 8: Python code for Cryptography key generation  
 
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, MultiFernet 
key1 = Fernet(Fernet.generate_key()) 
key2 = Fernet(Fernet.generate_key()) 
f = MultiFernet([key1, key2]) 






key3 = Fernet(Fernet.generate_key()) 
f2 = MultiFernet([key3, key1, key2]) 



































Appendix 9: Python code for encryption algorithm process  
 
if not data: 












if not data: 






























Appendix 10: Python code for decryption algorithm process  
 
print(applicant_document.document_id) 
        
file_path_decrypted=f"{os.getcwd()}/app/blue_prints/static/images/decrypted_t
emp/{applicant_document.document_id}.png" 
        
file_path_encrypted=f"{os.getcwd()}/app/blue_prints/static/images/encrypted/{
applicant_document.document_id}.png" 
        
file_path_keys=f"{os.getcwd()}/app/blue_prints/static/images/keys/{applicant_
document.document_id}.txt" 
        key1_decoded=open(file_path_keys,"r") 
        key1_encoded=key1_decoded.readline().encode() 
        key2_bytes=KEY_2_BYTES 
        key2 = Fernet(key2_bytes) 
        decrypted_key1=key2.decrypt(key1_encoded) 
        key1_bytes=decrypted_key1 
        key1 = Fernet(key1_bytes) 
 
        f = MultiFernet([key1, key2]) 
        file_2=open(file_path_encrypted,"rb") 
        while True: 
            data1=file_2.read() 
            if not data1: 
                break 
            decrypted_file=open(file_path_decrypted,"wb") 
            token = f.decrypt(data1) 
            decrypted_file.write(token) 
            decrypted_file.close() 
        file_2.close() 
        key1_decoded.close() 
        session.close() 
        return True 
















Appendix 11: Python code for Database model settings         
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, ForeignKey, Table 
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship 
from sqlalchemy.ext.declarative import declarative_base 
Base = declarative_base() 
class User(Base): 
__tablename__ = 'user' 
import os,os.path 
from passlib.hash import sha256_crypt 
import time 
import models 
from models.utils.db_config import ( 
    CONFIG, 
    DB_PATH 
    ) 
from models.utils import dbConfig 
 
class DBCheck(object): 
    """docstring for DBCheck""" 
    def __init__(self): 
        super(DBCheck, self).__init__() 
         
        if not os.path.exists(f"{DB_PATH}"): 
            print(u"database does not exist.\n Generating a new database 
schema...") 
            dbConfig.Base.metadata.create_all(dbConfig.engine) 
            password=u"habib@2019" 
            hashed = sha256_crypt.encrypt(password) 
            session=dbConfig.Session() 
            default_user=models.User( 
                            username=u"admin@e-passport.com", 
                            role=u"head-quater", 
                            password=hashed 
                            ) 
            session.add(default_user) 
            session.commit() 
            session.close() 
             
            print(u"Database Successfully set...") 










Appendix 12: Python code for biometric template and biodata encryption  
 
from .encrypt_decrypt import( 
    DecryptImage, 
    EncryptImage 
    ) 
 
__all__=( 
    DecryptImage, 
    EncryptImage 
    ) 
 
     spif_decrypt 
        ) 
    spif_decrypt( 
        "DETF.py", 
        "1.txt", 
        "2.png", 
        0, 
        "-m" 
        ) 
 
   spif_decrypt, 
    spif_encrypt 
    ) 
 
class DecryptImage(object): 
    """docstring for DecryptImage""" 
 
    def __init__(self, **kwargs): 
        super(DecryptImage, self).__init__() 
 
        self.decryption_and_encryption_table = 
kwargs['decryption_and_encryption_table'] 
        self.input_file_path=kwargs['input_file_path'] 
        self.output_file_path=kwargs['output_file_path'] 
        self.mute="-m" 
        self.encryption_level=0 
 
    def __call__(self): 
         
        spif_decrypt( 
            self.decryption_and_encryption_table, 
            self.input_file_path, 
            self.output_file_path, 
            self.encryption_level, 
            self.mute 





    """docstring for EncryptImage""" 
 
    def __init__(self, **kwargs): 
        super(EncryptImage, self).__init__() 
         
        self.decryption_and_encryption_table = 
kwargs['decryption_and_encryption_table'] 
        self.input_file_path=kwargs['input_file_path'] 
        self.output_file_path=kwargs['output_file_path'] 
        self.mute="-m" 
        self.encryption_level=0 
 
    def __call__(self): 
         
        spif_encrypt( 
            self.decryption_and_encryption_table, 
            self.input_file_path, 
            self.output_file_path, 
            self.encryption_level, 
            self.mute 
            ) 




























Appendix 13: Python code for Twilio SMS  
 
from twilio.rest import Client 
account_sid = 'ACXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX' 
auth_token = 'your_auth_token' 
client = Client(account_sid, auth_token) 
 
message = client.messages \ 
    .create( 
              body='Hi there!', 
              from_='+256xxxxxxx', 
              to='+256xxxxxxxx' 
              ) 
 
print(message.sid) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
